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LEGAL RHETORIC UNDER STRESS:
THE EXAMPLE OF VICHY
Richard Weisberg*
INTRODUCTION

Most of us have a tendency to think of the European disaster of
1933-45 in terms of physical violence of the worst, previously
unimaginable kind. We have, in our mind's eye, masses of bodies.
We think of the· depersonalization of victimized groups, of the refusal
to see certain people as real, specific individuals, and of the resulting
• Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.
Beginning in 1982, I have made periodic trips to France to ascertain something of the
reality of that legal community during the War years. I have since amassed, there and at Yad
Vashem in Jerusalem, some 2,500 documents, and I have interviewed a score of lawyers and
functionaries who lived the period as adults, some flourishing, others chased from their profes
sion and in hiding.
Most researchers into Vichy history will concur with me as to the invaluability of the
documentary services of the Centre de Documentation Juive Contemporaine in Paris (CDJC).
The CDJC, since the war itself when its founders had already courageously begun to document
the period, has been graciously receptive to researchers. The gates at other documentary cen
ters, such as the Archives Nationales (AN) have swung a bit wider in the past few years, their
rich fund ofmaterials gradually seeing the light of day. Other collections remain, sadly, closed
off.
Meanwhile, lawyers and functionaries with memories of the Vichy years have become
more responsive recently. If, in 1982 and 1983, I was universally greeted with the twofold
answer: "Well, we were all in the Resistance--at least after 1944" and "Are you sure, young
man, that you want to pursue this research?"-! now am granted lengthy interviews in which
information ofa more substantive nature emerges. Some ofthese individuals have helped with
the documentary work. For example, Jean Barthelemy, a practicing Parisian lawyer, and the
grandson of one of the Vichy Justice Ministers, granted me a two-hour interview and then
allowed me to see almost all of his grandfather's private papers. While some of these are
available at the AN, photocopying is not permitted there, and he graciously granted me photo
copying privileges. Furthermore, while Jean Barthelemy has recently published an important
book of memoirs by his grandfather, annotated with very helpful notes, he allowed me to see a
variety of documents not included there.
I would like to thank the archivists at the following research centers: at Yad Vashem in
Jerusalem, Cynthia Haft; at the CDJC in Paris, Monsieur Jacobson; at the AN in Paris, Mme.
Bonazzi. For their generous support of my project, I thank Yeshiva University; the American
Council of Learned Societies; and the Sassoon International Center for the Study of Anti
Semitism at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. Finally, For their help in gaining access to
various Parisian archives, I express my gratitude to Laurence Craig, Eric Friedman, and Serge
Klarsfeld.
Where I have used archival documents, I have noted their locations followed by their
particular identifying marks. Also, in a number of instances, I have included more informa
tion than called for by conventional law review citation forms (e.g. original date of publication,
publisher, etc.). Translations of documents are my own.
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elimination of "anonymous, despised hordes." We do not think of
language as playing much of a role in this horror, with one exception.
We tend to believe that the German people, on whom, almost exclu
sively, we lay the blame for the Holocaust, were seduced into the vio
lence by the brilhantly crazed rhetoric of their leader. From Hitler's
hysterical words to the death camps sometimes appears to have been
one horrifying step.
• , e
The purpose of this article is to show that a very different kind of
rhetoric, in a very different kind of country, also led to death on a
massive scale during the War years. The rhetoric was generated m
France by men and women sitting at their desks; it arose, remarkably
enough, with substantial independence from German interference or
influence. It was the rhetoric of the law. This was a rhetoric of indi
vidual cases, not of mass depersonalization. It isolated out for indi
vidual analysis, rather than herded together, the subjects of its
discourse. It used reason, not emotion, to identify these subjects.
For several years, I have been examining the way in which law
yers spoke during the stressful period of French history known as
"Vichy," 1940-44. In this article I present a variety of empirical data
and make a claim arising from the data. The claim is that a loose
system of institutionally acceptable professional rhetoric caused as
much as did the terror or influence of German occupation—the defi
nition, identification, and eventual destruction of tens of thousands of
Jews, for the majority (but not the entirety) of such legal rhetoric was
unchecked by an interpretive model that would have permitted re
course to certain foundational beliefs to evaluate and constrain itself.
There are at least three corollaries of my claim, the first two of
which are fully developed here and the third of which is merely intro
duced in these pages: first, that the French legal community outdid
the demands of the German occupiers and the examples of the Ger
man precedents; second, that "interpretive communities" need more
than their situational sense of things to avoid catastrophe both to
themselves and those their decisions affect; and third, that the Vichy
lawyers' ingrained ability to avoid the conflict between the racial laws
and the foundational egalitarianism of traditional French constitu
tional law shows there may well be a cause-and-effect link between an
interpretive theory (here, anti-textuaUsm) and the behavior of the
group of interpreters it purports to describe.
The first corollary flows from the claim itself: German power and
coercion cannot alone account for the ills that befell Jews on French
soil during 1940-44, some 90,000 of whom were deported from
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France to their extermination abroad.' By analyzing the sophisti
cated jurisprudential debate in Vichy France on the issue of "Who is a
Jew?," and then by providing an example of an autonomous body of
French legal doctrine connected to that definitional discourse (landlord-tenant law), I demonstrate that unconstrained professional dis
course more than German political pressure led to an excess of
French zeal and thus a needless amount of Jewish suffering. My
treatment of the first corollary expresses a central risk of professional
ism, perhaps most notably legal professionahsm—that lawyers seek
relief from considering the basic premises of their actions by recourse
to eloquence, formalism and the situational realities of the "job." It
stands as a lesson to contemporary American lawyers, whatever the
constitutional, egahtarian or procedural principles that appear to pro
tect us from such behavior. For those "foundational" premises also
existed in wartime France; yet they were trumped by the community's
tolerance for narrower lines of discomse that studiously avoided (for
the most part) the challenge of first principles.
The second and third corollaries relate both to the specifics of
French legal history and the seemingly far-removed topical phenome
non of "Law and Literature" theory. In the second corollary, I seek
to demonstrate that the popular notion of a protective professional or
1 Estimates of the number of Jews deported from France between 1940 and 1944 vary
greatly. Robert Paxton's original research placed the number between 60,000 and 65,000. R.
PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE: OLD GUARD AND NEW ORDER 1940-1944 at 183 (1972). This
statistic, he speculated, included 6,000 French citizens. Id. Later, when working with
Michael Mamis, Paxton modified his figure, placing it closer to 75,000. M. MARRUS & R.
PAXTON, VICHY FRANCE AND THE JEWS 343 (1981). This latter figure coincides with Serge
Karlsfeld's estimate. S. KLARSFELD, VICHY AUSCHWITZ 7 (1983). Klarsfeld estimated a preWar population of 360,000. Id. at 344. Joseph Billig, however, concluded that as many as
120,000 Jews were deported from France during that time. 1 J. BILLIG, LE COMMISSARIAT
G£N£RAL AUX QUESTIONS JUIVES 253 (1955). My number, 90,000, is not based on new
research, but rather is an attempt at a consensus of the varying authorities.
Xavier Vallat, the first head of the infamous agency in charge of Jewish questions, the
Commissariat general aux questions juives (CGQJ), writing from prison just after the War,
said this:
France counted 330,000 Jews in 1939, of whom 50% were foreigners. In
1946, the number was 180,000, of whom 160,000 were of French nationality.
Vallat, Affaires juives, in 2 LA VIE DE FRANCE SOUS L'OCCUPATION 672 (Hoover Institute,
Stanford University, 1947).
Vallat's figures, even factoring in some pre-armistice migration or post-armistice flight,
are quite different from the currently accept^ ones. Vallat ostensibly had no reason to lie,
since he was already in prison and would not distort the figures. Other comments made by
Vallat about wartime racial policy, however, cast everything he says into some doubt; thus in
this same document he interposes one of the more amazing bits of rhetoric about the Vichy
years: "One decidedly cannot reproach French officials for not having known of the abomina
tions that even those who were the victims did not suspect. . . ." Id. at 677. For more Vallat
rhetoric on related issues, see infra discussion at note 25.
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situational discourse-typified by the phrase "interpretive commu
nity"2-bends and breaks in the wake of Vichy France's example. By
answering Richard Posner's critique of my earlier use of Vichy law in
The Failure of the Word, 3 I first show that many of Posner's norma
tive assumptions about professional rhetoric and behavior in fact un
wittingly demonstrate the force of the second corollary-that
interpretive communities need more than a merely situational sense of
things. And by engaging the somewhat related discourse of Stanley
Fish (who has not as yet addressed the implications of his theory for
periods of holocaustic professional conduct), I assert that lawyers
need recourse to textual standards of conduct and cannot rely on the
practices of their profession alone to avoid future catastrophes. Here
I willingly concede the difficulty of establishing norms apart from the
interpretive practices surrounding them;4 but my point, embodied in
the third corollary, is that the lesson of Vichy demands of our genera
tion a theoretical posture in search of such norms. Hence I argue that
the prevalent "post-modernist" hermeneutics, itself in radical disarray
for reasons connected to my subject, 5 directly risks producing modes
2 See. e.g.• s. FISH,Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRE
TIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
Fish maintains that every person speaks "from within a set of interests and concerns" and
it is "in relation to those interests and concerns" that a person's words are understood. If
communication or understanding occurs,it will not be because the two people speaking "share
a language,in the sense of knowing the meanings of individual words and the rules for combin
ing them,but because a way of thinking,a form of life,shares [them] and implicates [them] in
a world of already-in-place objects,purposes,goals, procedures, values,and so on; and it is to
the features of that world that any words [they] utter will be heard as necessarily referring."
Id. at 303-04.
Fish insists that "communication occurs only within such a system (or context,or situa
tion,or interpretive community) and that the understanding achieved by two or more persons
is specific to that system and determinate only within its confines." Id. at 304. See also infra
text accompanying note 96 (summary of the Fish - Fiss debate.)
3 R. WEISBERG,THE FAILURE OF THE WORD: THE PROTAGONIST AS LAWYER IN MOD
ERN FICTION (1984).
4 See Fiss,Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Fish,Fish v. Fiss,
36 STAN. L. REV. 1325 (1984).
5 This school of thought,often labelled "deconstructionist," has been discombobulated by
revelations about the wartime activities in Belgium of one of its outstanding figures,literary
critic Paul de Man. De Man is strongly identified with this school,and his writings highly
influential within it. No less a figure than Jacques Derrida said, in eulogy: "As we know
already but as we shall also come to realize more and more,he transformed the field of literary
theory,revitalizing all the channels that irrigate it both inside and outside the university,in the
United States and Europe." See Lehman, The Fall of Paul de Man, New York Forward,Jan.
11, 1991,at 11,col. l .
In 1987,four years after de Man's death,details surfaced about his wartime activities. He
had written facially collaborationist pieces for the pro-Nazi newspaper Le Soir. This revela
tion tarred de Man,his later critical works, and by association the deconstructionist school.
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of practice that replicate Vichy's text-avoidance, relativism, and ethi
cal debasement.
The historical subject of this article thus serves both as an exam
ple and as a first cause of our contemporary, situational duty to ex
plore the risks of professional discourse. Post-Holocaust (a term I
prefer to post-modem) theories that appear to liberate legal rhetoric
from ethical norms are at best untimely and at worst perverse. No
matter how difficult the quest for a "text" that will stand on its own to
influence lawyers and others on the meaning of Vichy France, I argue
here that the quest should proceed, sanctioned—rather than contra
dicted—^by mainstream interpretive theory.
It is well worth recalling, 200 years after the French Revolution,
how little allegiance there was to eighteenth-century revolutionary
norms once the rhetorical floodgates were opened by articulate Vichy
collaborators. Thus in 1940, only 80 of almost 600 French legislators
refused on constitutional grounds to grant the Vichy leader, Petain,
virtually total monarchical powers.® One of those 80, the young law
yer Philippe Serre, was to be hounded into exile for his courageous
allegiance to text; others in his camp were to be executed by the Vichy
regime for their vote. Serre, whom I recently interviewed, recognized
at the time that the breach of constitutional norms represented, in his
words, "the end of democracy in France."^
This same Philippe Serre, a non-Jew and still proud Frenchman,
remarked to me of the Vichy-authored anti-Jewish laws of 1940-44:
"The Germans would not have insisted on a racial policy if the
French had refused."® By the time of our conversation, in late 1988,
my research had led me to a similar conclusion, but for different rea
sons. Serre saw the extensive Vichy racism as the twin result of
Petain's "dictatorship" and the elevation of mediocre and often antiSemitic ideologues to power under the Marechal; he excepted his felMany words, much energy, and some intellectual capital have been spent in villifying, defend
ing, and explaining Paul de Man. Id.
For a critique, see Holdheim, On Jacques Derrida's "Paul de Man's War," 15 CRITICAL
INQUIRY 784 (1989); for a defense, see Felman, Paul de Man's Silence, 15 CRITICAL INQUIRY
704 (1989).
For my part, as one of de Man's former graduate students, I believe that the relationship
of deconstructionism to post-Holocaust intellectual developments deserves study apart from
the unfortunate biography of any one thinker. See Weisberg, Text Into Theory: A Literary
Approach to the Constitution, 20 GA. L. REV. 939, 942-62 (1986) (discussing Heidegger and de
Man); Weisberg, De Man Missing Nietzsche: 'Hinzugedichtet' Revisited, in NIETZSCHE AS
POSTMODERNIST (Koelb, ed. 1990).
* R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 32.
' Interview with Phillipe Serre, in Paris (Dec. 21, 1988).
* Id. (quoted in Weisberg, France: From Vichy to Carpentras, Wall St. J., Oct. 12-13,
1990, op. ed. page, col. 3 (intemat'l ed.)).
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low private lawyers, who "se sont bien tenus" (i.e. who "conducted
themselves properly"), criticizing instead the magistrates. But I felt,
by then, that there were mixed results in all areas of legal practice,
and that it was that practice and its discursive elasticity (and not-the
anti-Semitism of any one leader or group) that brought about the ex
tent of the horror.
I focus here on merely two of literally hundreds of areas of Vichy
legislation and caselaw.' The first considers the disputes as to burden
of proof and admissability of evidence on the basic question "Who Is
a Jew?" The second exemplifies a discrete body of caselaw—here
landlord and tenant—^arising from the new legislation.
I.
Any analysis of Vichy rhetoric must begin with the law of 2 June,
1941, promulgated by the Vichy justice minister, Joseph Barthelemy
and other government officials, and known as the "Statut des juifs."
A sequel to a Vichy law of 3 October, 1940,'° this "2 June statute," as
I shall call it, was designed to eliminate Jewish property ownership
and to restrict or even eliminate Jewish participation in many profes
sions and trades. Eventually it would be supplemented by almost 200
laws, ordinances, decrees, and rulings authored by French lawyers
' Mamis and Paxton, in their necessarily brief section on Vichy law, list another halfdozen, one of their list tangential to the landlord-tenant problem discussed here. See M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 143.
•o Loi portant statut des juifs, 3 Oct. 1940, Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise
[J.O.] (Oct. 18, 1940), D.P. IV at 312, reprinted in CENTRE DE DOCUMENTATION JUIVE
CONTEMPORAINE, LES JUIFS SOUS L'OCCUPATION: RECUEIL DES TEXTES OFFICIELS FRANCAis ET ALLEMANDS 1940/1944 at 19 (Paris: CDJC 1982) [hereinafter LES JUIFS SOUS
L'OCCUPATION]. This statute, the first to define who is a Jew under Vichy law, was reputedly
written by Joseph Barthelemy's predecessor as Justice Minister, Raphael Alibert, a known
anti-Semite. Although it differed in certain ways from the 2 June, 1941 statute, which replaced
it, both have been considered "Vichy" statutes by most authoritative French sources (and
certainly by wartime German sources): "Le 3 octobre [1940], le gouvemement de Vichy
promulguait le statut des Juifs en y introduisant la notion de race." ("On October 3, the Vichy
government promulgated the Jewish laws by introducing to them the notion of race.") "Inventaire: File AJ 38," at the Archives nationales, Paris, [hereinafter, AN] 1st cahier; see also,
Michele Cointet, Le Conseil national de Vichy 135 (1984) (doctoral thesis presented to the
faculty of the University of Paris X for a doctorat d'etat) (on file with author). The Germans
always split their analysis of racial legislation into clear categories: their own, and Vichy's. (As
I explore infra note 28, they wound up frequently adopting the Vichy racial laws for the occu
pied zone as well.)
Vichy justice minister Joseph Barthelemy offered a self-interested minority view, from his
perspective as one who, after all, signed the 2 June, 1941 law: "Cette legislation n'est pas
d'initiative fran^se: elle est toute entiere d'origine allemande." ("These laws are not a French
creation, but entirely originated by the Germans.") J. BARTHELEMY, MINISTRE DE LA JUS
TICE: MEMOIRES 311 (Paris: Pygnudion, 1989). See also infra notes 51 and accompanying text
(describing independent statutory activity by Vichy).
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and officials. 11 The 2 June statute begins, quite logically, with a defi
nition of the word "Jew":
1. A Jew is: He or she, of whatever faith, who is an issue of at
least three grandparents of the Jewish race, or of simply two if his/
her spouse is an issue herself/himself of two grandparents of the
Jewish race.
A grandparent having belonged to the Jewish religion is con
sidered to be of the Jewish race;
2. He or she who belongs to the Jewish religion, or who belonged
to it on June 25, 1940, and who is the issue of two grandparents of
the Jewish race.
Non-affiliation with the Jewish religion is established by proof
of belonging to one of the other faiths recognized by the State
before the law of 9 December 1905.
The disavowal or annulment of recognition of a child consid
ered to be Jewish is without effect as regards the preceding
sections.
[There follows the prohibitions for such people on property
ownership and some employment; sanctions-including im
prisonment-are then declared for engaging in proscribed
activities.] 12

When I read the statute for the first time, I asked myself and
others these questions: was this written by the French, with their long
history of at least theoretical and constitutional equality before the
law and freedom of religion-or was this imposed by the German
conqueror? Was this degree of precision and legalistic verbiage really
at work in the arrests of Jews on French soil that eventually led to
large-scale deportations? Did not the German occupier (rather than
the French) simply round up masses of indistinguishable people who
lived in Jewish neighborhoods, herding them into trucks or buses,
then onto trains to the death camps? Was not depersonalization,
rather than specific definition, the method of the terrorizers, as
Hannah Arendt seemed to argue? 13 Were Jews even in Vichy itself.
the so-called non-occupied zone administered exclusively by the
French-defined and victimized by this law? And did the 2 June,
1941 statute become the linchpin for decisions, taken by courts before
whom learned counsel would argue, that would then decide the fate of
thousands of individuals in both zones?
11 LES JUIFS Sous L'OcCUPATI0N, supra note 10, at 185-92 (giving a full list of these
laws).
12 Loi du 2juin 1941 remplac;ant la Joi du 3 octobre 1940 portant statut lesjuifs, J.O. (June
14, 1941), D.A.L. at 300, reprinted in LES JUIFS Sous L'OcCUPATION, supra note 10, at 49;
see also Appendix one ..
13 H. ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 295-96 (1951; 1973).
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As I learned more, I came to ask two additional questions: In
what ways did the racial policy in France exceed that required by the
German conquerors? Was there any rhetorical device or tactic, avail
able situationally to the French lawyer who wrote, interpreted and
applied that social policy, to reverse the fatal flow of events? My re
search into these basic questions was structured by analyzing the
three major domains in which lawyers wrote and spoke: in the govemment,^'^ in the courts,*' and in the private sector.*® For each do
main, I examined primarily, but by no means exclusively, the means
of interpretation and implementation of the Jewish laws; their rela
tionship to legal rhetoric and practice within the domains (e.g., the
Humerus clausus on Jewish lawyers and law students; the prohibition
against Jewish magistrates) and without (e.g., the application of the
laws to specific situations).
I quickly found, however, a kind of seamless web of legislation
and policy, in which the racial laws became connected, for example,
with broader constitutional issues;*' with problems of conflict of laws
14 xhe French government under Martial Petain had its seat of operations in Vichy and
was part of the "zone non-occupee" that enjoyed at least nominal independence from the Ger
man authorities. But the Germans increasingly allowed Vichy law and Vichy policy to extend
to the "zone occupee" as well. See infra note 28.
•5 The court system remained, structurally, substantially unchanged, although there was at
least one major new court created—the "Cour supreme"—and there were new, summary juris
dictions of existing courts, e.g., the infamous "sections speciales" which tried and execute
political prisoners, agitators, randomly selected hostages, etc., without right of appeal and in
complete secrecy and undue haste. But the Jewish laws were worked out largely by the tradi
tional dual system of French adjudication: the civil courts, with their app^s courts culminat
ing in the Cour de cassation, and the administrative courts, commencing here often with
decrees of the Minister of Justice or, later, decisions of the Commissariat general aux questions
juives (created by the law of 29 March, 1941, J.O. (Mar. 31, 1941), reprinted in LES JUIFS
Sous L'OccuPATiON, supra note 10, at 39), reviewable by the chief administrative court, the
Conseil d'Etat. The Conseil d'Etat received increased power under Vichy, and had within it
specific sections and committees charged with examining all racial legislation. For example,
the Conseil's "Section du statut des juifs," consisting of members from each of its major stand
ing sections, issued the opinion on "What Means of Proof ..." that Joseph Haennig com
mented on in his 1943 article, cited infra text accompanying note 39. See Commission du
statut des juifs. Avis du Conseil d'Etat du Decembre 1942, Legislation de I'Occupation, Jan.Mar., 1943, at 29, reprinted in LES JUIFS SOUS L'OCCUPATION, supra note 10, at 172.
16 These include avocats and avoues (the former pleading before courts and agmcies; the
latter, with their cousins, the notaires, handling land transfers and other transactions), and
formal groupings of private lawyers such as the Paris Bar Association under the leadership of
Jacques Charpentier, of whom more later, infra notes 77, 87-88 and accompanying text. Law
professors in France, unlike here, are better considered government functionaries than pnvate
attorneys. They too played a significant role in furthering the racial rhetoric innovated by
Vichy. Joseph Barthelemy himself was drawn from the academy to the seat of ministerial
power. For the participation of other law professors, see, e.g., Lochak, La Doctrine Sous Vichy
ou les Mesaventures du Positivisme, in LES USAGES SOCIAUX DU DROIT 252, 252-53 (Paris.
P.U.F., 1989); and infra notes 43, 76.
IT Constitutional issues were raised most publicly in the prolonged and much discussed
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or rules of evidence;'® with traditional values such as the right to
counsel and to an attorney-client privilege;" with jurisdictional dis
putes as between administrative courts or agencies, and civil courts;
and with internal issues such as: the salaries of lawyers, the explosion
of litigation under Vichy,^ and the way entrance examinations and
"Riom Trial." See generally HENRI MICHEL, LE PROCfes DE RIOM 107-13 (Paris: Albin
Michel, 1979). At Riom, the Vichy government brought criminal charges against various offi
cials of Third Republic governments deemed responsible for the French defeat. Defense coun
sel for some of these accused consistently raised "foundational," constitutional arguments
against the appropriateness of the proceedings, and in the case against L6on Blum the defend
ant's Jewishness itself emerged as an issue. Stee also infra notes 41, 82; Appendix seven (dis
cussing the trial of Lion Blum).
As another example here, Vichy undertook a major constitutional reform project which
envisioned, but never acheived, basic changes unrelated to the racial laws. See, e.g.,
Barth61emy, Ministre de la Justice, supra note 10, at 123, discussing Jacques Bardoux, a lead
ing member of the Vichy-originated Constitutional Commission. Nonetheless, the regime's
racial policy affected both the makeup of the committee charged with that reform (no Jews
were allowed), and its specific proposed provisions about freedom of religion, ex-post facto
laws, foreign treaties, property ownership, denaturalization, et cetera. I will treat this slice of
Vichy legal life at greater length in my book.
18 Questions of burden of proof arose in a variety of legal areas not necessarily racial in
nature. One notable official, cWboulives, the Directeur des affaires civiles et du sceau (Minis
try of Justice, 1941), effectively protested against a proposed law that would require all French
to "justify their means of existence and the source of their property since 1 September, 1939."
Camboulives felt that such a law would unjustly shift the burden of proof, traditionally on the
State, to the individual. Letter from Camboulives to Barthelemy (October 15, 1941), AN:
72AJ-412, dossier 6. No such argument as to principle was ever raised, in or out of govern
ment, on the shifting of the burden to the purported Jew under the racial laws. Instead, as we
shall see, that debate had to develop gradually, through the subtle rhetoric of judicial decisions
and learned articles. Legal discourse took a similar tack on matters of penalties of internment
or even deportation, and on the relationship of the new racial legislation to preceding or con
current French laws that did not on their terms apply to race. See infra Section XL
See, e.g., supra note 17 (discussion of the Riom political trial whose threat to this privi
lege provided open discussion of this issue by defense counsel); infra note 87 (Charpentier's
protests to Petain).
20 The explosion of statutory material during the Vichy years is noted often and from many
perspectives. Some of the increase, of course, derived from the several hundred or so new
racial statutes, ordinances, decrees and major cases. Dalloz "Jurisprudence generale" for
1937-41, and then 1942-46, gives six full pages of statutes and cases under "Juifs." In a memo
of March 15, 1942 to the CGQJ, Darlan rejects the latter's call for yet another change in racial
definition by citing some 80,000 specific matters that had already been filed under the existing
statute by that date. See CDJC: CXIV-24. But this litgious aspect of Vichy culture was more
generalized. Thus, on Feb. 17, 1943, a Vichy memo argued for the hiring of many new judges
on all levels:
The complexity of recent legislation, the increase in the small number of crimes
and misdemeanors, have considerably raised the number of matters brought before
various jurisdictions. For example, the criminal court of MontpeUier, which de
cided 966 matters in 1938, took on 2,980 in 1942; the Limoges court saw its
caseload increase from 696 to 2,502; Bordeaux's from 2,557 to 4,601; Quimper's
from 398 to 990.
AN: BB30 1715 (Internal Vichy memorandum suggesting, to remedy this, not the calling up of
Jewish judges who had been fired, but instead the immediate repatriation of French judges still
held as prisoners-of-war in Germany).
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even law-school courses should be conducted. From the earth-shat
tering to the banal, there was an expansion of legalistic issues con
nected to that law of 2 June, 1941 and its predecessors and progeny.
The 2 June statute indeed gave rise to what was easily the richest
and most protracted legal debate of the period: who bears the burden
of proof on the question of what the Vichy writers called "belonging
to the Jewish race." The 2 June statute is not explicit on the point,
although the language ("is established by proof of belonging to one of
the other faiths ... ") might imply that the individual has the burden.
The procedural issue, vital (as lawyers know) to the outcome of any
piece of litigation, divided lawyers for four long years.
Upon this burden of proof question hung careers, fortunes, lives.
For the 2 June statute left another gaping loophole when attempting
to deal with the pervasive case of an individual with only two Jewish
grandparents. It was here that the law coerced litigation and legal
rhetoric. Anyone with three or more Jewish grandparents was irrebuttably Jewish, as a matter of "race"; anyone with one or no Jew
ish grandparents was an "aryan" under this race-based approach,
even if Jewish under Jewish law (by having a Jewish maternal grand
mother) and even if (secretly) a Jew. Unless married to another Jew,
however, the person with exactly two Jewish grandparents provided
an ambiguous case.
This is the kind of question that lawyers love to attack. Ameri
can as well as French lawyers might find here the tempting kind of
statutory void that volumes of verbiage will soon fill. How can an
interpretive community that thrives on such problems resist? What
choices do members of that community have? Before returning to
these questions, which are central to a discussion of my claim, let me
continue empirically by revealing what French lawyers actually did.
First, they drew pictures to explain to themselves the various peram
bulations.^' Then they began to debate the ambiguous statutory
point; within a matter of weeks, they were divided, as an observer put
it (making it sound more like a young wine than a legal matter of the
gravest consequence), on "cette matiere fort delicate et nouvelle"
("this new and delicate matter").^^
Of no small interest was the obvious mistake in the statute, de
claring Jewish any individual with only two Jewish grandparents but
married to someone "of two Jewish grandparents of the Jewish race."
This, on its terms, would exclude from Jewishness half-Jews marrying
21 For representative diagrams, see Appendix two. CDJC: XVIIa-38 (166 and 167).
22 From the "Bulletin quotidien d'etudes et d'informations economiques," Paris, #380 for
19 August, 1942, article entitled "Qu'est-ce qu'un juif?," CDJC: CDXXIX-1.
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someone with more than two Jewish grandparents or himself/herself
a practicing Jew. While no private lawyer, to my knowledge, dared
that argument in favor of a half-Jewish client, the lawyers in govern
ment agencies quickly saw the mistake. As the French administrative
agency charged with Jewish questions—the Commissariat General
aux Questions Juives (CGQJ)—put it, in December, 1941:
We are faced with a defect in the drafting of the law that will soon
be corrected. [It never was; it never needed to be.] But good sense
requires that it be interpreted as though it said: "if his/her spouse
is Jewish," and not "if his/her spouse is an issue of two grandpar
ents of the Jewish race."^^

Government lawyers, judges, and private attorneys all had much
to say about the "delicate" debate. As early as the end of 1940 (con
struing a similar provision in the law of 3 October of that year), a
justice department lawyer wrote to the Minister of the Interior of
... a yet more delicate case, although admittedly unusual and
manageable, that of an individual, presumably of Jewish origins,
but the issue of grandparents who practiced no religion or who
were married civilly. How can we find the key to this problem?
Arduous genealogical research might have to be on an interna
tional scale.^^
For Xavier Vallat, the first Commissioner of the CGQJ, there was no
doubt that the 2 June statute placed this occasionally overwhelming
burden on the individual; writing just after the War of this problem,
he says:
But how could we know if the grandparents were of the Jewish
reUgion, since Jewish communities in France did not have records
like those of the parish churches? It was only possible to deter
mine this by forcing their descendants to furnish the contrary
proof, that is evidence establishing that their grandparents had be
longed to other recognized religions then in France: Catholic, Prot
estant, Orthodox or Islam.
And what about atheists, some will ask us? The answer is
23 Letter from CGQJ to its regional director in Toulouse, CDJC: XVIIa-38 (156). The
context of the correspondence is interesting, too. The Toulouse director was inquiring about
the case of two first cousins who marry, having common Jewish grandparents, the Leboucher
case. See Appendix three, CDJC; XVII-38 (157). He felt that the common grandparents
"should not be counted twice to conclude that the grandchildren become Jewish because they
have married." After all, absent the first-cousin relationship, a discrete total of four separate
Jewish grandparents (not two!) would be necessary to consider the couple Jewish. The central
CGQJ bureaucrat was willing to agree, because, as we just saw, he felt the 2 June statute
should be read to insist on the Jewishness of the spouse; thus, each cousin had to be treated
individually to determine his/her Jewishness, and the marriage one to the other would be
irrelevant.
AN: BB-30-1714.
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simple. We were dealing with people bom in the first half of the
19th century and, in that period, atheism practically did not
exist.^'

As quickly as 21 November, 1941, Vallat's CGQJ was busy slap
ping the wrists of such magistrates as the Procureur in Toulouse who
dared to reverse the burden. Declaring itself the best judge of the 2
June statute, "because of the minute study of the texts . . . our posi
tion is unattackable. It consists of this affirmation: that the burden of
proof, in all contests relating to the quality of Jewishness, must be
carried by the individual and not by our Commission."^®
Not everyone connected with the Vichy government reveled in
placing this almost insurmountable burden on the individual rather
than the state. But it may be significant that the strongest statement
from Vichy against such an interpretation came from a writer, not a
lawyer.^' An essayist who briefly served in Petain's cabinet, Rene
Gillouin complained directly to the Marechal on this point:
II est regrettable ... que ce soit desormais au presume juif de faire
la preuve de son innocence [sic], et non plus a la justice.
L'innovation juridique est inquietante pour tous. La dispersion des
biens par dissolution de la communaute sapera la famille. La loi
frangaise est plus severe que la loi allemande.
(It is regrettable... that from now on the putative Jew will have to
prove her/his innocence [sic], and the State no longer needs to
prove her/his guilt. This judicial innovation is disquieting for
everyone. The dispersion of property by dissolution of the commu
nity will sap the family. French law is more severe than German
25 Vallat, supra note 1, at 659-60. Vallat goes on to assert, among other things, that the
Vichy racial laws helped to save "95% of French Jews," while admitting that, of the 330,000
Jews he counted on French soil before the war, only 180,000 remained in 1946. Id. at 672. He
blames only a few "sordid" individuals or groups for the spoliation of Jewish property,
amounting to many millions of francs, without reimbursement or eventual return of the prop
erty in most cases. Id. at 659. Vallat, whose legislative abilities and anti-Semitic attack on
Leon Blum while both were in the National Assembly commended him to the Germans for
this post, was charged with developing the Jewish legislation, see, e.g., 1 JOSEPH BILLIC, LE
COMMISSARIAT CFENFERAL AUX QUESTIONS JUIVES 59 (Paris: Editions du centre, 1955) [here
inafter J. BILLIG, LE COMMISSARIAT OFENFERAU]. As to spoliation, Vallat himself described
one of his main tasks at the CGQJ to be "de pourchasser la fortune anonyme et vagabonde
d'Israel [to pursue the anonymous and roving fortune of Israel]." 1 J. BILLIG, LE COMMISSA
RIAT GFENFERAL, supra, at 7.
26 Letter from CGQJ to the Regional prefect of Toulouse, complaining of the prosecutor's
approach to the burden-of-proof question in the Doifmann case, CDJC: XVIIa-45 (2501).
22 Not that the story of the French literary community is altogether a happy one, as re
gards the new racial situation. See, e.g., HERBERT LOTTMAN, THE LEFT BANK (1982); see
also Weisberg, Avoiding Central Realities: Narrative Terror Under Vichy and the Occupation, 5
HUM. RTS. Q. 151, 166 (1983) (discussing Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir, and others whose
careers flourished during this period).
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law.)^®
28 M. Cointet (thesis), supra note 10, at 960 (quoting Gillouin).
As Robert Aron put it a decade after the war, somewhat modestly, the French statutory
scheme was "plus severe que celle de quelques pays satellites du troisieme Reich" ("harsher
than those of a few countries attached to the Third Reich"); Aron cites specifically the Vichy
imposition of the burden of proof on the individual instead of the state. See R. ARON, HISTOIRE DE VICHY 227 (Paris: Fayard, 1954); see also M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1,
at 205, 232, 263, 241-45, 334.
Certainly Jewish observers concurred as they analyzed the effects of the 2 June statute.
The newsletter "Informations juives" of November 7, 1941, for example, observed that the
statute exceeded even earlier German ordinances for occupied France by adding two substan
tive factors: the limit of June 25, 1940 for any attempts to convert or otherwise show nonobservance of Judaism; and the stipulation that, with only two Jewish grandparents, one married
to a Jew would irrebuttably be deemed a Jew. (The Germans were far less fixed in their ap
proach to this common situation.)
The Germans themselves, on several occasions, had to slap the wrists of French lawyers
and bureaucrats whose legalistic zeal carried them beyond the strictness of German legal
precedents. Hence, the chief of the Parisian Judenamt, Rothke, felt constrained to write
CGQJ to advise them that the testimony of Catholic priests affirming the baptism of an alleged
Jew with two aryan grandparents (or otherwise needing to sustain the burden of proof) was
definitive from the perspective of German law. He wanted the French, who tended to disallow
or devalue such evidence, to follow the more liberal German evidentiary model. CDJC: CXV83; see also infra note 38 and accompanying text (discussing the Weiller case). On baptism, see
injfra notes 30, 43, and accompanying text.
The Germans of course chose to capitalize on French legal excesses in most areas.
Although the first German ordinance defines Jew (anterior to any Vichy legislation), this was
replaced by two later ordinances parroting the then-existing Vichy laws, which were more
inclusive. See CDJC: XVIIa-45. Thus, on 1 July, 1942, SS Obersturmfuhrer Dannecker
writes in a memorandum regarding the 2 June 1941 statute that, comparing the German and
French definitions of Jew, "the French defiqition being broader, it will now serve as a basis in
all doubtful cases" (CDJC: XXVI, 36).
As to the overbreadth of the French racial definition, the case of ethnic Georgians living
in France is instructive. Here, the French themselves recognized they were breaking new
ground, in terms of comparative law with the Nazi courts, yet proceeded anyway. The head of
CGQJ's section on these laws thus writes, as late as 10 March, 1944, to his subordinate in
Toulouse, that Georgians of Mosaic belief on French soil should be considered Jews under
Vichy law:
For the moment, under French law, Georgians of Jewish belief must be re
garded as having issued from three grandparents of Jewish religion and thus cov
ered by the Statut des Juifs. . . .
The German authorities exempt from the wearing of the Star such Georgians,
because they consider them not to be of pure Jewish race.
Still, it does not appear that this exemption must ipso-facto bring about the
removal of the aryan trustees that you have deemed it necessary to place in control
of Georgian property. On the contrary, I have decided that, in every case, these
Georgians must be made the object of aryanisation measures.
Letter from the "Directeur du Statut des Personnes" to CGQJ Regional Director in Toulouse,
(dated "Paris, le 10 Mars 1944"), archival reference missing: see Apppndix six for the full
document.
In every regard, including the "Final Solution" itself, the French could be fully counted
on to provide the legalistic basis and the means to rid France of Jews. The lawyer Laval
begged the Germans to deport Jewish children not previously demanded. See Appendix ten
(correspondence between Paris and Berlin advising Adolph Eichmann that Laval was insisting
that Jewish children 16-years-old and under be deported with their parents; it took Eichmann
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If the government debated the point, soon deciding that the individual
several weeks to condone Laval's innovation); see also M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note
1, at 263; a top police oflScial, Rene Bousquet, begged them to allow deportations from the
Unoccupied Zone. Id. at 241. (Bousquet, now in his eighties, was recently ordered to stand
trial for crimes against humanity, based in part on information uncovered by Parisian lawyer
Serge Klarsfeld. See Eytan, Mitterand Accused of Hiding Vichy Ties, The Jewish Week, Inc.,
December 28, 1990, at 10, col 1.) No wonder that, in late 1942, Dannecker's office could
confidently write the following;
It is desirable that, regarding the Final Solution of Jewish questions, purely French
organisations handle this in France. Still, this solution cannot yet be realised
100% with the present structure.
CDJC: XXVI, 80.
The Germans soon after this learned that there was still less need for German manpower
in the French "final solution." By mid-1943 The Paris Standartenfuhrer and head of Paris
Police (Dr. Knochen) was asking Berlin for 250 SS to help in French-originated round-ups of
newly denaturalized Jews, and Berlin gently but firmly denied the need even for such m^est
numbers. "I recognize how hard your work is without sufficient personnel, but one SS-Fiihrer
and 3 subordinates will suffice." Telegram from the head of the French gestapo in Paris to Dr.
Knochen, marked "Endlosung der Judenfrage in Frankreich," (July 2, 1943), CDJC; XXVII23. Bousquefs police provided all that was needed for the massive roundups of 1942 and 1943.
Vichy law, and not German demands, created the need for Vichy police enforcement. In
May, 1942, the Chief of Police on Jewish Questions of the CGQJ observed;
The rapidity with which Jewish legislation has been established and with
which these measures have been applied makes us fear that, from what we see
everyday with our own eyes, there may be huge deficiencies in vital personnel [to
implement the poUcies].
CDJC; CXI-17. Thousands of police, guards, bus drivers, railway workers, even construction
people, had to be re-positioned or newly hired; all of this was accompUshed with an absolute
minimum—even in the occupied zone—of German personnel or guidance. See infra notes 53
& 54.
On the broadest scale, a preliminary review of the documents makes clear that detention
and even deportation (e.g. of children) were largely initiated by French lawyers, with the reac
tive support (and only later the active insistence) of the Germans. Although my conclusion on
this point goes somewhat beyond that of earlier historians such as Marrus md Paxton, they
state emphatically that "Any simple [explanation] of German Diktat can be dismissed summa
rily." M. MARRUS AND R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 5.
The following communication illustrates that Vichy legislation originated the policy of
detention long before the Germans insisted upon it. In January, 1941, Dr. Knochen wrote to
the German Military;
Foreign Jews on French soil number 1/2 of all Jews. The anti-Semitic devel
opments of the past few months indicate that anti-Jewish feelings among the
French are mainly directed to these foreign elements. This perspective is indicated
by the French regime's legislation, for example the law of 4 October, 1940 about
French stateless persons of the Jewish race, that gathers them together in Concen
tration Camps [Konzentrationslagem], as well as makes possible the enforcement
of special places of residence.
Note from Dr. Knochen to the German Military High Command in Paris (Jan. 28, 1941), Yad
Vashem 0-9/4-1, CDJC; V-64. For further discussion of this infamous law of 4 October, 1940,
see infra note 52. See also, e.g., 3 J. BILLIG, LE COMMISSARIAT G^N^RAL, supra note 25, at
314. As Vichy schemes to extend denaturalization to persons receiving citizenship after 1932
(and even 1928) progressed, the Germans permitted the French to go their own way, planning
again to capitalize on the Vichy legal initiative for their late-War deportation drive. See, e.g..
Memorandum to all police precincts in Paris from the Parisian Obersturmbannfuhrer (July 16,
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would have to prove his non-Jewishness ("innocence" as even the
sympathetic Gillouin put it), a second domain of legalistic rhetoric—
the courts—all the more extensively and controversially entered the
fray. In the case
Michel Benaim, for example, a court in Rabat
stated that:
an individual, issued from two Jewish grandparents and two nonJewish grandparents, who is both baptized according to the Catho
lic faith and circumcised according to the rites of the Hebraic law,
but who has never really belonged to the Catholic religion [must],
by reference to Article One, Siection Two [of the 2 June statute], be
declared Jewish as not having proved his non-adherence to the
Jewish religion by an actual membership in one of the other reli
gions recognized by the French state before the law of December 9,
1905.2'

Elsewhere, the Tribunal correctionnel of Brive decided that two
small children had not sufl5ciently shown their "innocence." Aged
two and three, these children had two Jewish and two non-Jewish
grandparents; they were both baptized. But the court decided that
truly to "belong" to another religion required "une volonte reflechie
et nettement exprimee que ne sauraient posseder des enfants de 2 et 3
ans" ("a considered and clearly expressed will that no child of 2 or 3
can possess"). Their father was thus convicted of not having declared
the children to be Jewish.^"
1943) (referring to this statute as basis for the Parisian roundups of July 23-24, 1943, CDJC:
XXVI-76).
29 Judgment of January 15, 1942, Tribunal de premiere instance, Rabat, CDJC: CXV-20.
30 Reported in J. LUBETZKI, LA CONDITION DES JUIFS EN FRANCE SOUS L'OCCUPATION
ALLEMANDE 1940-44 (Paris: Editions du Centre, 1945). But, in an expert opinion rendered on
a similar matter in 1944, law professor Jacques Maury indicates that this case was ultimately
reversed by the Court of App^s of Limoges; see Opinion of Jacques Maury (March 6, 1944)
CDJC: XVIIa-44 (240).
In contrast to the principal case is the long-standing view by such legal analysts as Dr.
Mosse of Perpignan that, at least as regards proof of Jewish ancestry, the personal feelings of
the ancestor are irrelevant. Hence: "From the point of view of the Law of 2 June, 1941, it is
irrelevant to argue the lack of religion or the impurity of race of the Jewish ancestors. The law
inquires neither into the religious beliefs nor the greater or lesser racial purity of the ancestors
. . . ." Extract attributed to Dr. Mosse, CDJC: XVIIa-38 (165).
Dr. Mosse's view renders irrelevant the personal beliefs of the grandparents, as long as
they were nominally Jewish; the principal case renders highly relevant the personal beliefs of
infants being baptized. The only way to harmonize the opinions is to see that both made life
more difficult for individuals trying to show their non-Jewishness.
Ironically, the notorious CGQJ took a more "liberal" approach to baptized babies. In an
advisory opinion, the Agency declared that war babies bom of mixed parentage, although not
in fact belonging to a recognized faith "before June 25, 1940," would be viewed (if baptized
immediately) as non-Jewish. Why? "Obviously it could not have been baptized before June
25, 1940, because it was not yet bom." Letter from the CGJC to its Regional Director in
Toulouse (Vichy, Aug. 18, 1942), CDJC: XVIIA-38 (158).
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Meanwhile, civil courts in such jurisdictions as Bergerac, Aix,
and Nice, were placing this difficult burden of proof on the State.
Such insubordination caught the attention both of the CGQJ ^d ite
reviewing administrative court, the immensely powerful Conseil
d'Etat; throughout the Vichy period, the Conseil d'Etat agreed with
the CGQJ that the civil courts simply had no jurisdiction over Jewish
definitional questions. While, as we shall see, the Conseil d Etat grad
ually broadened the kinds of evidence of non-Jewishness it might ^rmit the individual to submit, it rigorously stuck to the view both of ite
own exclusive jurisdiction and of the burden being upon the
individual.
The Conseil d'Etat finally seized upon a case called Maxudian in
April, 1943, both to illustrate its approach and to declare its sole juris
diction over this issue. Mme. Maxudian had apparently petitioned
her local police precinct to remove her name from its list of Jews.
When the police failed to respond, and the CGQJ also failed to ^ant
her request, she appealed to the Conseil d'Etet. That court held as
follows, declaring its jurisdiction as an explicit part of its decision:
Whereas it is stipulated that the petitioner is an issue of two Jewish
grandparents in the maternal line; that, if she produces a document
originating from the consistory church of Verdun of the reformed
faith from which it appears that her paternal grandparents, Mos«
and Sarah Lang, received the nuptial benediction in said church,
on March 14, 1843, this evidence is not of the sort to establish that
neither one nor the other of those people belonged to the Jewish
religion, in contrast to the presumption that arises from the en
tirety of the evidence in the dossier which, apart from such proof,
disallows Mme. Maxudian from justifying the claim that she can
not be considered a Jewess under the meaning of the law of 2 June,
1941."

To cement the point about administrative control over matters of
racial definition, the CGQJ several months later insisted that a couple
seeking a declaration of their non-Jewishness in order to have re
moved the aryan trustee who had been assigned to run their Joy store
in Beziers be prohibited from petitioning the civil tribunal of that
town. "It is beyond doubt," said the Agency, "that civil judicial
tribunals have no competence to declare the aryan nature of individu
als. Only the CGQJ can do that, because only it can issue certificates
31 See Judgment of June 12, 1940, Tribunal correctional, Bergerac, f
Palais, August 1-4, 1942, CDJC: CXV-61; Judgment of April 12, 1943, Tribunal Civil, Nice,
CDJC: CXV-119. See generally Weisberg, supra note 27, at 161-70.
..^o in
32 Judgment of April 2, 1943, Conseil d'Etat, extract from Gazette du Palais, Apnl 29-30,
1943, CDJC: XVIIa-45 (242).
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of non-adherence to the Jewish race.... If the CGQJ should refuse to
de!iver such a certificate, that person can appeal to the Conseil
d'Etat."33
The "Certificat de non-appartenance a la race juive" referred to
here was the passport to relief from the life-threatening strictures of
the racial laws. For hundreds of cases similar to the ones we have
noted, the "inside," "delicate" debate on the meaning of the 2 June
statute decided whether the individual would receive such a certifi
cate, exemplified by the one appended here. 34 Such certificates would
have a magical effect, allowing the bearer to avoid special curfews and
travel restrictions imposed on Jews, to fend off aryan administrators
all too eager to take over businesses and real property, to engage in
variou� professions and trades otherwise prohibited to Jews, to avoid,
finally, deportation-sometimes at the last minute as lawyers rushed
to the internment camp at Draney with the certificate, thus plucking
their clients from the line heading for the bus, heading for the train
"to the East."
The CGQJ treasured its monopoly on this jurisdiction, but the
civil courts kept finding ways to compete. Throughout 1943, opinions
such as the following appear, which at one and the same time claim
civil court jurisdiction over the 2 June statute (infuriating the CGQJ
and the Conseil d'Etat) and take a more liberal interpretive approach
(confusing the jurisprudence, and broadening the debate):
33 Communication from the CGQJ to the police chief in Montpellier, (dated "Vichy, Sept.
9, 1943), CDJC: XVIIa-38 (163). Indeed, on occasion the Conseil d'Etat did overturn a deci
sion of the CGQJ. For an example, consider the case of one Brigitte See to whose shoe store on
the Boulevard Malesherbes in Paris the CGQJ assigned an aryan administrator ("Adminis
trateur provisoire"); although insisting that Mme. See had the burden of proof, the Conseil
found she satisfied it by showing two non-Jewish grandparents and a third of uncertain religion
(the fourth being Jewish), and that she had been baptized at birth. Decision of April 30, 1943,
Conseil d'Etat, CDJC: XVIIa-45 (252).
Other frustrations for the CGQJ on this point are exemplified, throughout 1942, by its
unavailing attempts to get the Minister of Justice (Barthelemy) to recognize their claim that
ordinary courts did not have the expertise to handle many matters-particularly the aryaniza
tion of property-requiring definitions of Jewishness, etc. The Justice Ministry specifically
declined to impose unique jurisdiction on its administrative agency and courts, observing to
the CGQJ on 12 February, 1942 that, as to at least one of the issues raised, civil tribunals
might be especially competent to make decisions:
I have the honor of informing you that "the judge's belief " on the point of know
ing whether a sale transacted before the designation of a provisional administrator
eliminates effectively all Jewish influence, comes from an understanding of certain
factual and legal elements (the race of the buyer, relationship to the seller, true
market value of the property ... ) about which magistrates and tribunal judges
seem specially qualified, as a result of their experienct in civil and commercial
matters.
Letter from Justice Ministry to the CGQJ (Feb. 12, 1942), CDJC: CXV-8a.
34 See Appendix four (CDJC: XXXII-123).

1388

CARDOZO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:1371

[I]t appears from the [2 June] statute that definition as a Jew is a
function of the number and the race of the individual's
grandparents.
Whereas Charles Touati. . . was bom on 22 December, 1898
in Algiers of Israel and Eugenie Temime, themselves bom of un
known fathers and mothers who never acknowledged them;
That there are neither matemal nor patemal grandparents on
which his race can be determined;
That thus the law of 2 June, 1941 is not applicable to him.
Therefore, it is held that Charles Touati is not Jewish under
the meaning of the law of 2 June, 1941.^'

As the War was ending, and even the Conseil d'Etat could see
the handwriting on the wall, it too began opposing the CGQJ. In
mid-1944, the latter bitterly attacked its former surest ally for declar
ing as an aryan a woman with two Jewish grandparents who had
"spontaneously declared herself to be Jewish."^^
Around the same time, in a CGrQJ document called by a contem
porary observer, "une perle de la jurisprudence vichyssoise," the law
yer for a certain M. Elina was advised as follows:
My dear colleague: In order finally to dispose of this case, which
has been pending since 4 February, 1943,1 would be in your debt if
you could have sent to me by a member of the Medical Association
a declaration as to whether or not your client benefits from his
entire preputial integrity [que votre client jouit de toute son integrite preputiale].^'

Sadly, the use of such circumcision data was pervasive, particu
larly where the state was deemed to have the burden of proof. Civil
prosecutors used such data in their rigorous efforts to detect Jews
even toward the end of the war. In a case decided as late as 17 May,
1944, a Marcel Joseph Weiller narrowly escaped losing his hberty,
although he had been hitherto untouched—unlike tens of thousands
of other Jews on French soil who had by then been deported. Before
the Tribunal civil de premiere instance of Ceret, Weiller was accused
of failing to register himself as a Jew, even though the state could not
prove that he had at least three Jewish grandparents. Weiller's
"crime"? I quote from the opinion of the court:
Session of February 12, 1943, Tribunal civil de la Seine (lere Chambre), Paris (Report of
court decision in this case on file with the author).
36 See A CGQJ internal memorandum (undated) reporting the incident as it progressed
through June 22, 1944 and describing the Feb. 9, 1944 decision of the Conseil d'Etat as "sur
prising" and "contrary to the law of 2 June 1941." CDJC: XVII-36 (154a).
37 See Appendix five. Letter to M. Arnold Crochez, Avocat a la Cour, from CGQJ.
CDJC: XXIII-19.
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[Bjeing bom of at least two grandparents of that race, he would be
Jewish if found to belong himself to the Jewish religion. Weiller's
belonging to the Jewish race is apparent from the discovery, in his
house, of the Tablets of the Law, and of Hebrew prayers; from the
fact that he was circumcised at birth, and, contrary to his allega
tions, never baptized, the certificate of baptism delivered by the
vicar Berges of Toulouse being just an accommodation to him.

Weiller's production of a baptismal certificate, always (as we
have seen) less convincing to French courts than to German,'® availed
him little. The court thought it not quite a forgery, but almost so, and
they had the evidence of the Jewish sacred objects in Weiller's home,
and of a Dr. Cortade that Weiller was indeed circumcised. On the
other hand, a maid testified that she had seen Weiller perform certain
Catholic rites. Because the state (in this tribunal) had the burden, and
because the evidence was equally balanced, Weiller escaped retribu
tion and deportation. On such thin reeds, wispier than the words
themselves of which they are made, were fates decided, over and over
again, in Vichy France.
The evidence presented in this very late case fulfilled the plea of
Joseph Haennig, in 1943, that the broadest inquiry be allowed into the
Jewishness of the individual. The state should present evidence, and
so should the individual. Not only the individual's belonging to a
recognized rehgion should satisfy the courts, Haennig argued, but
also any other proof he might mount. This, Haennig advised, using
the gentle rhetoric he felt comfortable with at the time, was the ap
proach of the Nazi courts in Germany itself, whose "largeness and
objectivity of spirit" he hoped the French would emulate.
Haennig's analysis, published in the authoritative reporter of
French law, reads as follows:
"What Means of Proof Can the Jew of Mixed Blood Offer to Es
tablish His Nonafiiliation with the Jewish Race?"
The Commission on the Jewish Laws has been established by
the head of State to give its view on the interpretation of Article I
of the Law of 2 June 1941 concerning the subject of nonafiiliation
with the Jewish race.
The Commission believes that the statute writers allowed
more proof than merely that of belonging to another religion recogniz^ by the State prior to the law of 9 December 1905. It has
noted that "in each case, the adjudicator may ascertain that the
claimant either has never belonged or has ceased to belong in fact,
to the Jewish community" (Gazette du Palais 1943, 1st sem.. Doc
trine, p. 14). . . .
38 See supra note 28. The Weiller case is to be found at CDJC: XVIIa-45 (254).
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We believe that neither good sense nor the law could lead to
the view that the statute writers required of an individual having
only two Jewish grandparents proof of his belonging to the Catho
lic or Protestant denominations in order to avoid being included on
the Usts of Jews. . . .
Since the courts must now decide each case on its own merits,
we would do well to cite as an example German law, and thus to
see how it overcomes any difficulty relating to proof of nonaffihation with the Jewish race. This exercise reveals a largeness and
objectivity of spirit. . . .
A recent case of particular note dealt with the female descen
dant of two Jewish grandparents, baptized as a Protestant, who,
under the Article stipulating the definition of a citizen of the Reich,
only would become Jewish if she adhered to the Jewish religion,
the same solution incidentally as is reached under the law of 2 June
1941.
This woman of mixed Protestant and Jewish heritage had, for
a period of six months, at the express request of her Jewish father
and against the wishes of her Protestant mother, attended classes
at religious school to leam about the Jewish faith. Once each year
until her father's death in 1931, she accompanied him to syna
gogue on the New Year.
On the other hand, she never contributed to the synagogue,
while still retaining her name on the list kept there.
Under these circumstances and facts, the Supreme Court of
Leipzig was called on to consider her case. It first noted that, as
soon as she learned of the presence of her name on the Jewish lists,
she requested its removal, in the spring of 1938.
The Court affirmed the lower court judge's view that she had
only attended New Year's services in order to preserve family
peace. The view that there was no sufficient tie to the Jewish com
munity in this case was thus deemed correct.
[However, the defendant had called herself a Jew in order to
obtain employment from a Jewish agency.] Theoretically, the
Court of Leipzig refused to consider the motives leading an indi
vidual to certain specific acts apparently linking him to the Jewish
community. However, where these links have been merely for pre
tense, the court instructed lower courts not to take them into ac
count if it has been estabUshed, as in the instant case, that the
defendant was merely using the Jewish religion as a means to ac
quire an advantage by the intermediary.
This analysis of the German law furnishes an interesting con
tribution to the study of a subject still little understood by the
French courts. The analysis indicates a possible route, without
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risk of distorting the statute writers' intention, and in conformity
with the principles which underlie the racial statutes and cases.
Joseph Haennig,
Member of the Appellate Bar
Paris''
Haennig's 1943 essay raises dreadful questions, despite its benign
aura of liberal, legalistic eloquence. Superficially read, it looks like a
well-meaning attempt to limit somewhat the extent of racial oppres
sion. Placed in the context of Vichy rhetoric on Jewish definitional
questions, it stands as a paradigm for the French legal profession's
willingness to abandon allegiance to its textual traditions and to
"think the unthinkable, write the unwritable." As I have prelimina
rily discussed in The Failure of the Word^ and shall discuss more
fuUy in Part III of this article, Haennig's statement typifies the im
mersion in discourse that all too often screens lawyers from the cor
rupt atmosphere lurking above the surface of their words.
At the tvuming point of Vichy power, with the Axis armies
largely in retreat and the Normandy landing about a year oflf, Haen
nig and most of his colleagues were just warming to the jurisprudence
of Jewish identity. Gone for the majority of French lawyers were
thoughts of the still-existing constitutional guarantees of equal protec
tion, safeguarding of property, and avoidance of ex post facto laws.^'
This material originally appeared as an article by Joseph Haennig, a Parisian lawyer, in
the edition of the Gazette du Palais (the traditional reporter of French statutes and cases)
covering the first semester of 1943, at 31. The translation is my own.
^ R. WEISBERC, supra note 3.
Thoughts of the still-existing constitutional guarantees were not gone for everyone.
heoa Blum, in his opening speech to the court at Riom (see supra note 17), called the trial
itself a "legal monstrosity," since he and others were appearing as men already condemned, at
least by the head-of-state. The audience listened "with growing interest to this legal discussion
which little by little was transformed into an appeal for true justice and then reached the
heights of a protest in defense of the French republican ideal." J. COLTON, LEON BLUM:
HUMANIST IN POLITICS 407-08 (1987).
Blum's defense counsel at the Riom trial, Andre Le Troquer, demonstrated a similar be
lief in constitutional protection when he "moved to have the court declare itself illegal on the
ground that the constitutional act establishing it had not been ratified by the nation." Id. at
408. Le Troquer also "launched a diatribe against the Vichy regime—^its supression of repre
sentative institutions, its curbing of free speech, its arbitrary arrest, and imprisonment prac
tices." Id.
Daladier's attorney—Daladier had been head of state during 1940, and was on trial with
Blum—vociferously protested the Vichy court's use of ex post facto laws, invoking the Decla
ration of the Rights of Man as his authority, and remarking "Our children will read the juris
prudence of the year 1942 and will not understand it." Id. at 411. Altogether, an
understanding was exhibited that norms of French law continued during this period. Even
some Vichy functionaries expressed their uneasiness in the face of what they considered very
persuasive foundational arguments.
Had no lawyers voiced foundational, principled objections, the vast professional major-
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Instead, considering himself only bound by the internal discourse of
the "Jewish question," and not by any external norm, Haennig neatly
debated issues that shortly before he would have considered inadmissably grotesque.
Haennig's apparent lack of viciousness thus makes his case com
pelling for us today. Scores of lawyers Uke Haennig, even more than
those few who reUshed the infliction of suffering upon the Jews, made
that suffering possible. Once the Nazi state and its courts could be
cited by a mainstream lawyer as providing any kind of a model on
race issues, French law became unanchored—dashing towards its
own doom with no one at the helm but the most recently pubUshed
rhetorician.'*^
For any lawyer in 1943 who might still have wavered on the pro
fessional propriety of debating racial laws in Vichy as well as occupied
France, Haennig's seeming benevolence must surely have been per
suasive. If such evenhanded analysts, trying to narrow the already
overly broad French definition of Jew, could discourse freely on such
a subject, surely all whose practice touched on racial matters might
find solace. And, indeed, the French bar (always remarkably autono
mous from governmental control) had by then taken the statute to its
bosom, nurtured it, discovered its defects and its strengths, and—like
the parents of a still youthful upstart—discussed its future with a
combination of wariness and optimism.*^
ity's willingness to collaborate through the elasticity of their rhetoric could be understood as
politically inevitable. But it was not. Haennig's slippery, liberal-seeming discourse exhibits his
profession's fatal, but fully voluntary, participation in dreadful, legalistic violence.
For my view of the professional's compulsion to publish even when the subject matter is
grotesque, see infra pp. 1410-11.
Mamis and Paxton have accurately described Joseph Haennig's article as a suggestion
to French Courts to refer to German law "objectively and broadmindedly." They opine that
"this suggestion was not, to our knowledge, taken seriously by any French jurisdiction." M.
MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 143. In fact, Haennig was trying to convince French
courts that had already exceeded German jurisprudence on the burden of proof/evidentiary
standard issue discussed in this Section. Indeed, Haennig's superficially bizarre rhetoric con
tinued to be necessary throughout the War to French lawyers urging more benign interpreta
tions on their courts and colleagues. For example, note the expert analysis of law professor
Jacques Maury, who was asked, as late as March 6, 1944—^three months before the Normandy
invasion—to argue the same issues. Called upon to advise on the Jewishness of three young
children of mixed parentage, two baptized before 25 June, 1940 and one afterwards, Maury
cites Haennig on the still problematic case of the youngest child, who could not necessarily
prove his non-Jefmhness solely through the baptism:
One can take it today as certain [despite conflicting earlier cases in the civil courts
as well as the Conseil d'Etat] that an individual can demonstrate by any means,
even by presumptions, that he did not belong to the Jewish race on 25 June, 1940.
This is, indeed, the German solution, whether by ordinances of the occupying au
thorities of 1940, 1941 et 1942, or by application of the laws of the Reich of 15
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II.
Another broad body of caselaw, perhaps less well known to the
bar, and apparently of less interest to government lawyers, exemplifies
the seamless web of litigation I indicated earlier. In its interweaving
of various strands of French legislation, it further indicates how ago
nizing and unstable Vichy law became once it substituted Haenniglike—the freedom of the discursive moment for the constraint of con
stitutional ideals. By a decree of 26 September, 1939—^predating by a
year all racial laws—any tenant who had been mobilized for the War
could benefit from a seventy-five percent reduction in rent during the
period of his military service."^ Furthermore, the decree permitted
tenants the right to reductions, even after mobilization, if debilitated,
economically or otherwise, by a "Circumstance of War" {un fait de
guerre).*^
The question to which dozens of lawyers and judges had to turn
was whether Jews disadvantaged by the 2 June 1941 statute could
benefit from the rent reduction prescribed by the 26 September, 1939
decree. The latter, of course, was silent as to Jews. Lawyers for land
lords who might never have seen the racial statutes, and lawyers for
Jews who had been living with them on a daily basis, now had to use
their skills to harmonize two unrelated statutes and to use them for
their clients.
We have no documents indicating any interest by the Germ^
occupiers in this jurisprudence, even though most of the cases arose in
occupied Paris. Here was a purely internal matter of law, subject
even more so than in the rhetoric we have just examined only to the
usual discourse among lawyers and judges. Many landlords, faced
with Jewish tenants unable to pay their rent, went to court to evict.
From mid-1941 until the end of the war, before justices of the peace in
many of Paris's twenty arrondissements, before other civil courts of
original jurisdiction, and before various courts of appeal, lawyers ar
gued the legal niceties of the 26 September, 1939 decree on rent
reductions.
As developed regarding the 2 June statute, so here (so every
where that the interpretive community of French lawyers focussed its
September, 1935 (see articles by M. Haennig, Gaz. Pal. 7-9 October, 1942, and
27-30 March, 1943).
Opinion of Jacques Maury (March 6, 1944), CDJC: XVIIa-44 (240); see also Appendix eight
(a reference on official stationery to Haennig as an authority).
•• Gazette des Tribuneax, 20 October, 1939.
« See. e.g.. Judgment of April 2, 1942, J.P., Paris-20th Arrondissement, Gazette des
Tribuneaux, # 50, December 6-12, 1942, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
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attention) the debate was confined narrowly to several issues. The
main question was whether unemployment, detention, or deportation
constituted a Circumstance of War, so that victims might claim the
rent reduction; or whether the French government had acted quite
apart from the War, actions that might constitute a fait du prince
("act of state"). In the latter case, the tenants or their survivors
would not be granted rent reductions. The vicissitudes of legal argu
ment further created a minidebate on whether the results of the antiJewish climate might not have been a Circumstance of War pnor to 2
June 1941 and an act of state afterwards. Because it was a Vichy
statute, now applicable to the occupied zone as well, the 2 June, 1941
law marked a reasonable date to infer purely French activity of a ra
cially restrictive nature, arguably unconnected with the War.
Further squabbles arose as to whether detention might be seen as
a Circumstance of War (whenever arising), while "mere" loss of job
an act of state. Also, in the resolution stage of the trials, courts had to
decide whether the rent reduction (set by the decree at seventy-five
percent for any period of actual mobilization) should be the same or
less when the Circumstance of War was forced unemployment, deten
tion, or deportation.
What developed is unique in the jurisprudence of the Vichy
years. Courts of first jurisdiction overwhelmingly allowed some rent
reduction to the Jewish tenants. Yet the manner in which even
favorable decisions were rendered served to promote uncertainty and
confusion among similarly situated tenants who could not, chose not
to, or would only later litigate the question of their monthly rent. The
case law here, like Joseph Haennig's "benign" approach to the 2 June
1941 statute, forces on the analyst an inquiry as to the effect of seem
ingly benign legal discourse that chooses to work with—rather than
challenge centrally—a grotesque superstructure of law.
I will emphasize two courts of original jurisdiction, because they
decided more cases than any other on this point. These are the jus
tices of the peace of the 20th and 11th arrondissements of Paris itself.
We will see that each—again quite independently of the Germans, of
the French administrative structure, and of much appellate jurispru
dence—chose to define the questions before it in fascinating and
troubling ways. While each, although arguably contradicted by a
Paris appeals court decision we will analyze, favored the tenants
claims, they did so in conflicting ways. Their case law finally failed to
give heart or even certainty to a Jewish community desperate for
anchoring, for solace, and for some sign of protest by the French legal
establishment.

1991]

THE EXAMPLE OF VICHY

1395

I begin with the 20th arrondissement. In a typical case, the Jus
tice of the Peace there found for a M. Bankhelter, who received the
full seventy-five percent reduction for his army period (four months)
and thirty-five percent for his period in detention, which the court
formulaically asserted to be "by order of the Occupying authorities."
This court viewed forced detention as a Circumstance of War, and it
reUeved Bankhelter of that much of his rent from the date of his in
ternment until the date of the decision, 12 December, 1942, a period
of nineteen months.'*^
The 20th arrondissement had already developed a small body of
case law on this issue. On 19 June, 1941, in the Lerman case, the
court allowed a nonveteran a seventy percent reduction for having
been fired the year before, leaving him since then without resources.^'
While there is no discussion of the cause of Lerman's imemployment,
it seems probable that he demonstrated its link to the racial laws.
And in Baraban, decided 30 July, 1942, a detainee at the camp at
Beaunes la Rolande was relieved of seventy-five percent of his rent
obligation during his mobilization and fifty percent since his intern
ment some fourteen months prior to the decision.
Baraban begins to demonstrate some of the effect of rhetorical
maneuvering on the development of these laws. It is thus worth quot
ing in part:
Whereas his incarceration ... by the Occupying authorities
could not flow from the Law of 2 June, 1941, since the arrest was
prior to that date (14 May, 1941) but is in fact a Circumstance of
War;
Whereas this arrest has resulted in depriving him of all re
sources that he might have had as an artisan-tailor, although Jew
ish,^® as long as he conformed to the laws concerning Jewish work
[Thus, the court orders the reduction in rent.]^'
The first quoted paragraph is disingenuous. There was already a
Vichy-authored racial law of 3 October, 1940 in effect when Baraban
was arrested and detained;'® neither it nor the 2 June statute author
ized the random arrest and special incarceration inflicted on people
like Baraban. On the other hand, other Vichy statutes specifically
Judgment of December 12, 1942, J.P., Paris-20th Arrondissement, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
Judgment of June 19, 1941, J.P., Paris-20tli Arrondissement, CDJC: CDXXIX-2; see
also. Judgment of October 22, 1941, J.P., Paris-20th Arrondissement, CDJC: CDXXIX-1
{Reiner); Judgment of January 7, 1943, J.P., Paris-20th Arrondissement, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
The 2 June statute did not, on its terms, forbid Jews from being tailors.
« Judgment of July 30, 1942, Paris-20th Arrondissement, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
50 See supra note 10.
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condoning the detention of Jews, and their placement into special
camps, had also long been on the books prior to Baraban's arrest.
One of these, the Law of 4 October, 1940, stated:
Foreigners of the Jewish race can, as of the promulgation of
this law, be interned in special camps by the decision of the prefec
ture of the Department in which they live.'^
The Baraban court fails to mention any of these statutes, prefer
ring to situate its rhetoric as a legaUstic argument distinguishing pre2 June, 1941 arrests as clear Circumstances of War from later ones,
which might be acts of state. This is not the only time we will see
lawyers and judges feeling comfortable when they estabUsh narrow
and quite artificial zones within which to structure their discussions.
The Baraban judges, hke many Vichy lawyers, chose a low level of
discursive generalization: by focusing on the 2 Jime statute, they
avoided deahng with the earlier 4 October 1940 detention statute that
would be more difficult to rationalize. Furthermore, the term "Occu
pying authorities" begs the question—often begged in these cases—of
who actually did the arresting of Jews during the Vichy years. We
know by now, at least, that the French poUce did almost all the actual
" That there was such French-authored statutory activity prior to 2 June 1941 was irrefu
table. See especially, infra note 52, for further discussion of the incarceration law of 4 October,
1940, on which see also supra note 28; additionally, legal analysts should have been aware of
denaturalization laws of S^tember and October, 1940 that permitted the summary rounding
up and detention of denaturalized or foreign residents. The legal profession itself was stigma
tized; lawyers falling into the "foreign" category numbered in the hundreds and they, under
the Law of 11 September, 1940, were barred from practice, and then, by the law of 1 October,
1940, subject to detention, "s'ils sont en sumombre dans I'economie frangaise et si, ayant
cherche refuge en France, ils se trouvent dans Timpossibilite de regagner leur pays d'origine"
("if they are too numerous in the French economy and if, having sought refuge in France, they
now cannot get back to their native country").
Each magistrate undoubtedly knew, by late 1942, of dozens of former lawyers either
arrested or thrown out of work. My analysis of the reaction of non-Jewish lawyers to these
events must await another forum—although part of my present subject—but there surely was
a long history of French arrests prior to 2 June, 1941, and these would have been known to
these magistrates.
52 Loi sur les ressortissants etrangers de race juive, 4 octobre 1940, J.O., (Oct. 18, 1940),
reprinted in LES JUIFS SOUS L'OCCUPATION, supra note 10, at 22. By all accounts, first justice
minister Alibert not only signed the law, but also authored it. See, e.g., my personal interview
with a Vichy functionary close to the authorship of the law, Gilbert LeSage in Paris (Dec. 13,
1988). Obersturmfuhrer Dannecker consistently described it as a Vichy law: "Ich bemerke
noch, dass im unbesetzten Gebiet bereits 3 Konzentrationslager [3 concentration camps] fur
fremdstaatliche Juden bestehen, die unter Zugrundelegung des Vichyer Gesetzes vom 3.10.40
[sic] errichtet wurden." Note from Obersturmfuhrer Dannecker to Sturmbannfuhrer Zeitschel
(Paris, February 28, 1941) (emphasis added), Yad Vashem: V-63. Although Dannecker wrote
"3.10.40 [3 October 1940]," he must have been refering to the law of 4 October, 1940. The
Germans relied on this law throughout the war, as I will discuss in the wider manuscript of
which this article is a part. Without doubt, the concentration camp reality in France
originated as one of Vichy law's earliest innovations. See supra note 28.
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detaining of Jews until mid-1944. The Germans devoted almost no
manpower to the process.'^ Indeed, during the month of the Baraban
decision, judges and other citizens of Paris had observed with their
own eyes, or at least heard about, the infamous roundups (or "rafles")
of thousands of Parisian Jews by hundreds of Parisian police on 16-17
July, 1942. The pohce, with little or no German backing, herded the
terrified Jews into crowded houses in the various neighborhoods, and
from there to the Velodrome d'Hiver. It was, for most of them, a
matter of days until transfer to Drancy and, ultimately, Auschwitz.®^
Why did the Baraban court, together with most of its colleagues
in the other arrondissements, come to use the formula "arretes par les
autorites de rOccupation"?" A simple answer would be that it was
employing what I have elsewhere called "considerate communica
tion;"'® it was hiding from its various audiences the troubling truth
that, from the earliest days of Vichy, the French (without German
help) were arresting Jews both in the occupied and nonoccupied
zones, by force of their own statutes.
Whatever the motive, it is worth reflecting for a moment on the
legal effect of the three 20th arrondissement cases so far described,
Bankhelter, Lerman, and Baraban. What might the family of a de53 M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 241-42, 263-64, 271; see also supra note 28.
54 See sources cited supra note S3. Maurice Rajsfus tells of his own experiences during this
two-day grand rafle, referred to by Vichy with the sinister euphemism Vent printanier (spring
wind). He and his family were among the almost thirteen thousand Jews arrested in the grand
rafle. Rajsfus stresses the centrality of Parisian police, whom he describes as almost entirely
without sympathy for those they were rounding up. When it was announced by the police
some hours titer the arrests that children under sixteen would not be further detained, parents
were forced to decide whether to send their children btu:k into the street alone, or to keep their
family together. The parents of the fourteen-year-old Maurice and his sixteen-yettf-old sister
reluctantly decided to let them go. The two children thus escaped deportation and death, but
thousands did not, including an eleven-year-old cousin to whom he dedicates the book. See
MAURICE RAJSFUS, JEUDI NOIR, 16 JUILLET 1942: L'HONNEUR PERDU DE LA FRANCE
PROFONDE (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1988).
55 The formula frustrated a stingy landlord in the late 1942 case of Neyman. Sometime in
July, 1942, probably during the grand rafle (described supra note 54 and accompanying text),
Neyman was arrested. His arrest left his wife unsupported; earlier, their business had been
snatched and, ever since May 1941, run by an "administrateur provisoire." Nonetheless,
Neyman had been able to pay the rent until his arrest. Even before they lost their business, an
earlier decision of 6 April, 1940 had reduced their rent in response to Neyman's military ser
vice. But the landlord now argued that "the new diminution in resources resulted not from a
Circumstance of War but instead from rules and decrees currently in force against the Jews."
The court would not (rather than could not) accept that reasoning, choosing to fall back upon
the established formula that Neyman "a ete arrete par les Autorites d'Occupation" ("was ar
rested by the Occupying Authorities"). Again, the court ignored the fact that the French
police acting under Vichy law had arrested Neyman in July, 1942. Although the court ignored
Vichy involvement, it did allow a fifty-percent reduction, retroactive to the July arrest. Judg
ment of December 8, 1942, Tribunal civil de la Seine, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
56 See R. WEISBERG, supra note 3, chs. 8, 9.
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tained Jew. arrested after 2 June, 1941 (eventually the vast majority)
argue to that apparently sympathetic court in an eflfort to gam a rent
reduction? Nothing in the jurisprudence so far would allow the argu
ment that post- 2 June, 1941 arrests constituted Circumstan(^ of
War, because the jurisprudence universally involved arrets pnor to
that date. The court might have taken a stance from the beginning
forthrightly recognizing that most of the victimization of Jews was a
Vichy Law phenomenon but bearing a cause-and-eflFect relationship o
the War and hence covered by the 26 September, 1939 decree. This
approach would have empowered all suflFering Jewish tenants to ac
quire rent reductions. Instead the court consistently left open the cen
tral questions that a lawyer more constrained by constitutional text
should have asked.
,
T
IQAI
As we saw with the rhetorical approach t^en to the 2 June 1941
definitions themselves, the piecemeal, tunnel vision resolution of spe
cific contests—even if producing a benign outcome m the individu^
case—had the efiFect of disempowering vast categones of people who
came later. And rarely, even in these unique landlord-tenant cases,
did any lawyer or court attempt at the beginning to ask different sets
of questions that might more broadly have challenged the legislative
scheme altogether.'®
• ir u
Indeed, the legalistic distinction drawn in Baraban, itself based
on a fiction, between arrests made prior to the 2 June statute an ^
those subsequent to it, gained authoritative legalistic acceptance.
The fiction both ignored Vichy detention and race le^slation from at
least 3 and 4 October, 1940 until 2 June, 1941 and left open whether
the latter was an Act of War or of State. An^ogous to the swift Jide
of rhetoric that made the 2 June statute unchallengeable at its rotten
core, this argument deflected attention from the ^^sivenes^
French anti-Semitic statutory activity long before 2 June, 1941.
57 For such an approach, see the Krouck case, infra text accompanying note 61.
58 A minority oflawyers did raise publicly foundational concerns about the development of
wartime Fr"Sat
note 41 (discussion of the Riom trial, with its defense
iuBular foundational attacks on the Vichy legal system); infra notes 85-88 and acrom^ymg
tei (further accounts of Riom and other pubUc arguments by lawyers against the Vichy aws)
see also infra note 89 (noting a letter from Belgian lawyers expressing outrage at
there! But most lawyers felt more comfortable avoiding such higher levels of generalization
Sud «.U«.
.p««™ of
tXSC"
Vichy casts into a shadowy comer even the seemingly benign junsprudence of the landlo
'T s^g.. 3 LES LOVERS DE GUERRE 56 (Paris: 1943) (CDJC: CDXXIX-2). a treatise
accepting the distinction.
60 See supra notes 51 & 52 and accompanying text.
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disabled the families of most Jews, arrested after 2 J\me, 1941, from
arguing with any probabUity of success in that arrondissement^
The 11th arrondissement, on the other hand, took the "^ll
horns in a February, 1943 decision that faces more sq^ely the long
history of Jewish incarceration by Vichy law. It adopted, m the
Krouck case,®' the rhetorical variation I mentioned earlier. Kwwk
held that, since the first such Vichy law (dated 3 September, 19
)
stated exphcitly that "the effects of this measure, circumscribing indi
vidual rights, will end with the war," all subsequent detention laws
must—a fortiori—also be connected with the hostilities, as a Circum
stance of War. The 11th, unlike the 20th, thus admitted the Vichy
origins of laws detaining Jews—laws that predate the 2 June statute
by nine months—but used statutory interpretation to connrct those
French laws with the War. Thus Krouck, detained for the smple
reason of being a stateless Jew,®^ received a rent reduction of fifty
same court would use this reasoning a month later to help
another detainee. In the March, 1943 case ofEisenberg, again m the
nth arrondissement, the landlord was forced, by the Krouck case, to
become even more explicit about French influence on anti-Jewish leg
islation and punishment. He argued, frankly but unsuccessfully, as
follows:

.

Eisenberg, who was interned for being Jewish, c^not claim a rent
reduction [under the Decree of 26 September, 1939, etc.]. As an
act of state [fait du prince], the legislation imposed m orcupied ^d
non-occupied France cannot be causally connected with an Act ot
War.
It apphes to aU of France and is of unhmited duration; it wiU re
main in effect until the Legislator rescinds i t . . .

Using its earlier reasoning from Krouck, the court was now able to
admit both the French origins of internment laws and their causal
connection to the war. It rejected the landlord's argument and or
dered a forty percent rent reduction.
Thus, while the 11th and 20th arrondissements found ways to
6. Judgment of February 1, 1943, J.P. Paris-llth
62 This law. overtaken by the one cited centrally at supra note 52, stated that certain
individuals may be interned in specially designated camps."
63 See supra note 29; supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text
f^
laws, especially that of October 4, 1940 and the 1942 roundups m Pans of almost 13,000 Jews
t^TfSronSS earlier, the 11th arrondissement had foUowed basicaUy the same logic in
the CWo^rSse. Judgment of November 2, 1942, J.P., Paris-Hth Arrondissem^.
CDJC: CDXXIX-2. The court there gave a thirty-percent rent reduction to an unemployed,
stateless Jewish war veteran.
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grant relief to some Jewish tenants, their differing rhetoric created
confusion among the families of many other Jews potentially seeking
such relief later. The 11th, by freely admitting French authorship and
activity in anti-Jewish legislation of all kinds, produced a more r^listic rhetoric but nonetheless used statutory interpretation to grant rent
reductions; the 20th, on the other hand, used a formulaic approach to
create less forthright distinctions that kept similarly situated Jews in
the dark about their rights. No wonder that the Jewsh legal semce
of the Union generale des Israelites frangais (UGIF), in advising
hundreds of tenants and even their landlords' lawyers, could not rely
on this jurisprudence to make legalistic distinctions with any
confidence.
. .
In countless such situations, disequiUbrated by the junsprudence,
Jews were first advised to ask their landlords to decide the matter a
I'amiable"—without recourse to litigation. Thus for ex^ple, m Oc
tober 1942, the UGIF oflFered its help to the Topolanski family, whose
breadwinner had been arrested and deported after the enactment of
the 2 June, 1941 statute. The UGIF, despite the tenant-favorable
cases already on the books, had to write prayerfully to the landlord s
lawyer as follows:
May we not try to arrive at a friendly agreement here . . . ?
Mr. Topolanski, employed before the war in the Cominercial
Pharmaceutical Office, volunteered at the beginning of hostilities.
He always paid his rent fully and on time.
On 20 August, 1941, he was interned at the camp in Drancy,
on the order of the Occupation authorities. He was freed on 5 No
vember for reasons of health; but on 16 July, 1942, he was again
arrested and on the 22d of the same month deported to an un
known place. His wife has had no news of him since then.
Mrs. Topolanski has remained behind with three young chil
dren of 7, 5 1/2 and 20 months, and without any source of funds.
She has been described to us as particularly worthy of note.
Could you not, under these conditions, ask your client... if
h e could grant these pitiful tenants a reduction of 50% . . . .
We ourselves will guarantee that M. Poisson receives the bal
ance of the rents due from these tenants.

Other cases at the level of original jurisdiction might have af
forded some consolation, as the horrors of the Jewish expenence in
65 For two references on the work of the UGIF during the Vichy years.
J.
HAFT THE BARGAIN AND THE BRIDLE (Chicago: Dialog, 1983), and CENTRE DE DOCUMENL-Acnvnt ».S 0.OANI,AT,O» MIV., EN FEANC. <G.

Wellers & I. Schneerson, eds., Paris: CDJC^94^
rniC- CDXXIX-1
66 Letter to M. Remy from the UGIF (October 30, 1942), CDJC. CDXXIX 1.
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both zones increased, to the UGIF and to potential Jewish tenants or
their survivors. But they provided no doctrinal anchoring, no sense of
predictabihty. On the contrary, their rhetoric and even their disposi
tion of cases, showed more variation than we have seen as between the
courts in the 11th and 20th arrondissements.®'
Just as troublesome and disequilibrating was the only authorita
tive appeals court case that seems to have come down on this point of
landlord-tenant law. In the case, decided 29 September, 1941, the
Chambre des referes of the Cour de Paris unfortunately decided to
construe each of the two doctrines I ascribed to the 11th and 20th
arrondissement in a manner detrimental to the Jewish tenant, a doc
tor. First, the court held (unlike the 20th arrondissement) that even
very early legislation was of Vichy origin: the August and September,
1940 decrees restricting the practice of medicine by Jews were deemed
pure acts of Vichy administrative law. Second (unlike the 11th arron
dissement), this court specifically declined to associate that legislation
with the necessities of war:
As to that last order of administrative law [the decree of 16 Au
gust, 1940 prohibiting such practice®®], it cannot be said that it
bears a cause-and-effect relationship to the War; rather it derives
67 In a suburban case, the Justice of the Peace reduced the rent of M. Buck, who had
volunteered for the War, returned and then found himself arrrated. There are two mterestmg
aspects of this case. First, the court, unlike most others even in this area, does not hesitate to
characterize vividly the plight of Buch's wife and chUdren since his arrest:
His wife and three children are in a state of total deprivation [dans le plus
grand complet de denument], their subsistence avaUable only through chanties.
Second, the court allows, as a remedy, the full seventy-five percent reduction, "until the end of
the duration of hostilities," a strange but wonderful formulation in view of the ce^-flre of 22
June, 1940! Judgment of July 23, 1942, J.P., Boulogne-Billancourt, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
Even Jewish landladies gained assistance of a legalistic sort from this body of cases. Thus,
the Justice of the Peace of the 3d arrondissement, in Dreyfuss-Pignon, allowed a sixty-percent
reduction in the rent of a woman whose own real property no longer brought her rentals
because it had been aryanized and was now under the control of an administrator. Judgment
of February 25, 1943, J.P., Paris-3d Arrondissement, CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
The related case of hostages—those Jews taken randomly and specMy as reprisals for
attacks on Germans—was unproblematic, particularly in view of the doctrine that had deveoped By May 1942, a Justice of the Peace of the 13th arrondissement could observe that the
case of the hostage was already part of the "Doctrine et de la jurisprudence" of the Decrw of
26 September, 1939. Judgment of May 5, 1942, J.P., Paris-13th Arrondissement, CDJC:
CDXXIX-2. Hostage-taking was, indeed, a German activity, although the Vichy justice min
istry under Barthelemy collaborated in the creation of the infamous sections speciales that
came to try and often execute such hostages. See J. BARTHELEMY, supra note 10, at 245
(noting his anguish and blaming the "courts" on Pucheu).
68 For the basic Vichy text creating a numerus clausus and other restrictions on the prac
tice of medicine by Jews, see the Decree of 11 August, 1941, J.O. (Sept. 6, 1941), D.A.L. at
450, reprinted in LBS JUIFS SOUS L'OCCUPATION, supra note 10, at 69.
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from measures adopted by the Legislator^' that might have been
taken in circumstances having nothing to do with the War . . .
Thus, the doctor was allowed his seventy-five percent reduction dat
ing from his mobilization until 10 September, 1940, the exact date
when he was informed by the French poUce that he could no longer
practice medicine because of the racial laws. But he was not permit
ted any other reduction in rent under the 29 September, 1939 decree.
The appeals court's frank admission that the racial pohcy of
France was unconnected with the War not only again confirms this
article's first corollary, but seems to run counter to the earlier cases
discussed.'" It stood as an authoritative roadblock to any sense of
imderstanding, even under this uniquely benign set of cases, that im
poverished and terrified Jewish tenants might bring to the laws that
controlled their fate.
Synthesizing these cases, in an official memorandum from its
legal department in late 1943 or early 1944, the UGIF parsed the law
with combined rhetorical considerateness and legalistic opportunism.
First, the UGIF deemed it prudent to avoid the central reality of the
Vichy years, and the implied holding of the Paris appeals court: that
French lawyers and policemen consistently outperformed in their
anti-Semitism the fondest wishes—^much less demands—of the con
queror.'^ The UGIF construed the cases as follows, drawing an inter
esting distinction between detention and loss of work:
In fact, if it cannot be denied that the head of the French state has
promulgated a number of laws and decrees about Jews; these texts
limit the activity of Jews, either by restricting them in their trades
or certain professions, or in creating for them a special Law, but
none of these texts involve deprivation of liberty [sic'^], none or
ders the placement in an internment camp of Jews [sic] because of
their Jewish origin [sic].
On the other hand, the occupation authorities have rendered a
number of ordinances regarding Jews in the Occupied zone (nine
to this date'^), not only measures analogous to those taken by the
Also a fiction, although frequently used: The only "legislator" in Vichy was Petain,
assisted by his ministers and their legal staff.
•'O Judgment of September 29, 1941, Cour de Paris (Chambre des Referes), CDJC: CDXXIX-2.
''' See the discussion, supra text accompanying notes 45-67.
'2 See supra note 28.
See supra note 51, regarding the Vichy detention law of 4 October, 1940, whose origin
the writer of this memo, like so many of his profession, disregards. Furthermore, by the time
of the UGIF analysis, the mass roundups in Paris had already taken place, making obvious
even to a nonlawyer that detention was a Vichy policy, implemented with no or little German
urging or assistance. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
The number of these German ordinances was not to grow much larger, whereas the
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Head of the French state, but also a certain number of restrictions
on their liberty.^'
Finally, at different times, and for the first time in May, 1941
... Jewish males were arrested, sometimes with the assistance of
iiste compiled by the Occupying authorities, sometimes just on the
mention of the word "Juif" on identity cards.'^ Soon, Jewish fe
males were made the object of identical measures. .
Some categories of Jews have been specially targeted, for ex
ample on 21 August, 1941: arrests of all [sic] Jewish Lawyers.
French law regarding Jews was to number almost 200 statutes, decrees, rulings, etc. See LES
JUIFS Sous L'OCCUPATION, supra note 10, at 185-92; supra note 20.
, M LA
75 There is very little in the German ordinances about detention. See supra notes iu, i ,
51. The Sixth Ordinance, it is true, imposed a curfew on Jews from 8 p.m. to 6 a.in., and
forbade them from moving their residence, see the Sixth Ordinance of February 7, 19 (pu
lished Feb. 11, 1942), reprinted in LES JUIFS Sous L'OCCUPATION, supra note 10, at 139, and
the Ninth (July 8,1942, published July 15,1942, reprinted in LES JUIFS Sous UOCCUPATION,
supra note 10, at 161) forbade them entry into certain movie houses and restncted their shopoina in department stores and smaller estabUshments to one hour a day (3-4 p.m.), the hour
Liteg wMch, as one writer put it, "most shops were closed."
FRANCE ET LES FRAN^AIS DE 1939 A 1945 at 67 (Paris: Colin, 1970). T^e OERMMS first
capitalized on the (4 October 1940) statute that Vichy promulgated long before the Germans
were even prepared to address detention issues in France, and then permitted Vichy to wnte
and implement the additional legislation dealing with detention.
,
. .
. .
76 It was not until the eighth German ordinance, 29 May, 1942, that Jews in the^upi^
zone were forced to wear the yellow Star of David. See J. LUBETZKI, supra note 30, at ^5
The Vichy debates about the Star were colorful and complex; Vichy's legalistic debates about
Jews, including learned treatises by law professors suggesting special insignia and other means
of isolating Jews, make up an unfortunate part of this history.
e.g., A. BR^, LA guALITFE DE JUIF; UNE NOTION JURIDIQUE NOUVELLE 14-20 (Pans: Pr. Univ. de FrMce, 1943),
tyginning his legal treatise on the Jewish laws with a "learned analysis" of the reli^ous history
of the Jews, one that sets them apart from all other religions and is deserving of being segre
gated; jce also H. BAUDRY & J. AMBRE, LA CONDITION PUBLIQUE ET PRivfeE DU JUIF EN
FRANCE (Lyon: Desvigne, 1942), a treatise promising practitioners a better understMding of
the vital part of "la France nouvelle." The authors state, "For those in whom some liberalism
brings out a distaste for what they think of as [these laws'] show of sectanamsm we will
respond that anti-Semitism has never been inspired by anything except the non-sociability an
non-assimilability of the Jew." Id. at 11-12. The authors' analysis commences with the tradi
tional anti-Semitic history of "the wandering Jew."
77 Part of my larger study, as I indicated earlier, will be the treatment of lawyers specially,
both by the legislation and by their non-Jewish colleagues. The UGIF text refers to the begin
ning of the focus on arrests of lawyers, which continued throughout the war, Md eventually
touched hundreds of private lawyers and magistrates alike. See, e g., Appradix nme, PansSoir article of 12 September, 1941. The number of lawyers specially arrested was not all, ot
course, but forty. Among the forty lawyers arrested and interned in Drancy on 21 Au^st,
1941 many of whom were deported thereafter and never returned, was the distinguish^ Pansian lawyer, Pierre Masse, and others of his rank. Among the eloquent postwar acwladw to
the memory of Pierre Masse, see the "Discours prononce par M. Marcel Poignard, '1 July'
1946, in a publication of the Association of the Bar of Paris 25-28 (Paris: Impnmene du Palais,
1946). Poignard's predecessor as the "Batonnier" of the Order of Lawyers of the Bar, Jacquw
Charpentier, also treats Masse and some other Jewish colleagues at the wartime Pans bar with
reverence in his memoires of the Vichy period, throughout which he served as leader of the
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These are measures taken by the Occupation authority, wWch
have struck all categories of Jews, both French
natu^i^
. 7® If it cannot be denied that such me^ures, unposed by the
Head of State, restraining or suppressing activity, may not, accmding to the cases, permit a rent reduction by application of the De
cree of 26 September, 1939—since "such measures would have
been passed in circumstances other than of War (Pans Appea s
Court decision of 29/9/41)," the situation is different for intern
ment measures taken by the occupation authontira solely for rea
sons of War
It is clear that under these conditions, internment
in the camp at Drancy must be considered a consequence of the
state of War . . .

We have no subsequent decisions confirming the UGIF s analy
sis. We are left with a body of legal rhetoric, facially favorable to a
class of Jewish litigants but finally also contributing to the tenor as it
further legitimated racial jurisprudence. The case law s ambiguities
Paris Bar See J. CHARPENTIER, AU SERVICE DE LA LIBERT6 156-57 (Paris:
(on file at the Bibliotheque des Avocats, Palais de Justice. Paris). Chattier
ia^ues Bardoux. a Vichy lawyer who was in charge of the Constitutional reform project then
underway, about the arrest of the 40, but in vain.
*
u
On Charpentier's equivocal rhetoric in his book about Jewish lawyers at the bar gener^rNTzi^^tL^N^TOk^an interest in the arrests of Jewish lawyers, although
not appear to have originated them. 5ee Memorand^ of von
I^eal C^sel to the German Ambassador m Pans (October 5, 1941), CDJC. Vl (USJ. m

SLSnC „po,» » ttc G«.po
h. had b«n
(Aulol., Vdlia, ^ Metw.1) ..kh« tha> soma of fta o™

b,

lawyers be released from Drancy, "in the interests
reasoning appears to have been that, with so many mediocre, undesirable Jewish lawye
still free the average French lawyer might be disgusted to see these prominent oms impn
oned, and the arrests might "inspire pity in a segment of their
'wSt^t" group
Masse's name was apparently not raised by the group.) In fact, of the prominent grou^
Ulmo, Frank and Kahn were temporarily released. On these points, see
"T
von Bose (November 4, 1941), CDJC: VI (138). All three lawyers, however, event^ly per
ished during the Occupation. See Poignard, supra, at 6-7; the case of Jacques
ingly told by Maurice Allehaud after the war (Document in the Bibhrtheque des
Pdais de Justice, Paris, pp. 229-34). Frank, released from Drancy on 2 Novembw (^ccorAng
to A116haud, however, less due to pressure than to horrible health), never regamed his fomer
spirit and, several months later, committed suicide by throwing himself out a window. Id.
^^78 The writer continues to disregard Vichy's independent statutory and detention activity.

USF infustn?real or feigned, about certain grim
f
stood in the context of sheer terror pervading that organization, which tried ®
was officially beholden to German and French overlords. As just an ex^pl^relating
landlord tenant law of the Kafka-esque nature of the UGIF's tasks, consider that they we
i
r
i
t
a br!b^
"d
pcfa, » mld.1944. b>
UGIFs limited treasury those aryan landlords whose apartment
and damaged in the search for Jews. See
clu Registre
des Deliberations: Deliberation du 30 Mai 1944 (May 30, 1944), YV.
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certainly aflForded relief to those Jewish tenants—or their families—
who might eventually fall within the developing doctrine. But to the
many Jews in the 20th arrondissement who were arrested after 2 June,
1941- to those advised by lawyers of the appeals court's d^ision that
only iob-related loss, and not loss of liberty, could be ascnbed to the
French state; and to those in the 11th who saw the contrary con
firmed by the court, which recognized that their countrymen—and
not the Germans—^were responsible for the incarceration of men, wo
men, and children—these cases created only further confusion and
terror.
. • j- *
Landlord-tenant law in the France of 1940-44 again indicates
that professional rhetoric that disregards long traditions of profes
sional behavior is unacceptable even as it appears to be domg gwd.
My final section analyzes the theoretical implications of this empmcal
observation.
III.
Having perused two bodies of French wartinie legal doctrine, we
are ready to return to my claim about the insufficiency of flui^ situa
tional discourse in moments of crisis. Where, as in Vichy Fr^ce,
legal rhetoric is permitted to float free, it contributes to ^rhaps
even creates—the most dire consequences. We have seen demon
strated the corollary claim that Vichy legal discourse result^ in an
outperformance of the racial demands of Frances German
conquerors.®"
80

e.g., supra note 28. Of this claim, Richard Posner has imprudently wntt»:
There was indeed much anti-Semitism in France before and dunng World War II,
but the proposition that France would have tried on its own, as it were, to extermi
nate the Jews, or that it embraced genocide more enthusiastically than Germany
did, cannot be taken seriously.

R POSNER LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 172 (1988).

r haW n^t yet reached the point in our own discourse that merely assertive rl^tonc
such as this wUl block the clear-eyed analysis, by interested audiences,
J
have shown that Philippe Serre, a hero of the Vichy years and a man who is very moderate
otherwise in his critique of French lawyers, blames on the French the
^
brought death to 90,000 Jews from French soil. See supra text accompMymg Mte 8. Con
trary to Posner's blithe assertion, the most comprehensive histonans of the pen^ agr«
at^t the part of my conclusion that Vichy racism, m many key resets, outdid that of the
Germans. See supra note 10. And the legal documentation gather^ for the pr^J article
considerably expands upon earlier findings in this regard. See especially supra notes 28, 51, 52,
Posner's statement, typical of authoritative attempts to affect interpretive^—
rhetoric rather than reality, will not permit the possibility, which I would now call the
probabUity, that the French were more zealous than their German wnquerors m
®
dtudly racial policy through French law. Posner's only support for fas mcredulous 8"""de is
f«rte-fo^hs of the Jews in France (many of them refugees from Nazism rather than
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This Section begins by responding to Richard Posner's critique of
my earlier approach to what by now might be called "Haennig's
Choice."®' I observe centrally that an allegiance to French constituFrench nationals) survived the war and that the Vichy government tried to protect at least
French Jews from the Nazis, and, more generally, to dissociate itself from the 'Final Solu
tion'." R. POSNER, supra, at 172. This is a curious piece of rhetoric. First, Posner's fractional
estimates do not square with those of, say Xavier Vallat himself, see supra note 1. Still, Pos
ner's view that three-fourths of the Jews "survived the war" is generally held to be true. See,
e.g., M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 344. But no inference of admirable govern
mental conduct flows from any such fraction. In countries with far less autonomy, far fewer
Jews (proportionately) were lost. Then there is Posner's parenthetical, which (like Vichy itself)
seems to distinguish between French and foreign Jews. Yet, finally, the French regime proved
ready even to sacrifice "its own." See, e.g., M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 365-75
("[T]he Vichy regime set out to reduce the Jews—all Jews, not merely immigrants or refu
gees—to a subservient role, . . . and to subject them to humiliating restrictions."). As for
deportations, "the first convoy consisting of French Jews only left on 13 February 1943." J.
ADLER, THE JEWS OF PARIS AND THE FINAL SOLUTION 45 (N.Y.: Oxford 1985). Posner also
misrepresents French behavior insofar as he claims it even tried to dissociate itself from the
"Final Solution." See id. French law brought about, and French lawyers actively bargained
for, deportations "to the East." See supra notes 51 & 52. It can no longer credibly be main
tained that the government, at least Laval and the CGQJ, did not suspect the fate of those
deport"! See. e.g., 1 J. BILLIG, LE COMMISSARIAT G^N^RAL, supra note 25, at 229. Marrus
and Paxton hedge, in the general diplomatic spirit of their fine book, but seem to conclude
that, at least once deportations began from Vichy itself, Laval at least knew the horrid out
come. M. MARRUS & R. PAXTON, supra note 1, at 354-56. Contemporary diaries indicate
that many average observers could foresee the plight of Jews they saw deported from Vichy
soil. See, e.g., PIERRE-ANDR6 GUASTALLA, JOURNAL (1940-44) at 178 ^aris: Plon 1951)
(entry for 2 September, 1942):
Horrible things are happening at the camp called Milles near Aix and also in all
the camps in France. Jews of German, Austrian, and Czech nationality are being
herded together there, whether they're 20 or 60 years old, then crammed into cat
tle cars and sent to Poland in sealed trains.
Even if lawyers—unlike their lay countymen—remained blissfully ignorant of these de
partures and their probable destiny, even if they did not deliberately contribute to the geno
cide, we might still seek an explanation for their merely abiding the anti-Semitic innovations of
1940.44. The constitutional and egalitarian assumptions of 150 years would as little point to
"neutral" tolerance, see MARRUS & PAXTON, supra note 1, at 145, as to zealous advocacy for
such grotesque laws and policies. As Marrus and Paxton put it, on their more modest claim:
"It is hard today not to be surprised at the routine fashion with which this new legal order was
explained and applied." Id. at 144. (Marrus and Paxton recognize, of course, that in areas
they studied more closely (government behavior, such as that of Laval's), the French out
performed their conquerors' wishes and even desires. See id. at 232, 263, 364.) Posner will be
too anxious to be "t^en seriously" himself to disregard the issues raised by French wartime
legalism.
See R. POSNER, supra note 80, at 173-74; Posner, Book Review, 96 YALE L. J. 1173,
1188-89 (1987) (reviewing R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD (1984)); see also Ball,
Confessions, 1 CARDOZO STUDIES IN LAW AND LITERATURE 185,189 (1989) (referring to the
Haennig parable as a revealing warning "on giving succor to monstrous causes by making
them—wordily, academically, lawyerly—debatable"); Ayer, Book Review, 85 MICH. L. REV.
895, 908-10 (1987) (reviewing R. WEISBERG, THE FAILURE OF THE WORD) (disagreeing with
characterization of Haennig as "villain," and also with concepts that " 'wordiness' leads to
vice" or that the "wordless are by nature any purer than the wordy"); Robert Weisberg, The
Law-Literature Enterprise, 1 YALE J. L. AND HUM. 1, 32-33 (1988) (referring to The Failure of

THE EXAMPLE OF VICHY

1991]

1407

tional text and tradition was possible even under the eyes of the oc
cupiers,®^ and that Haennig could have mounted a "jugular" attack
on the system if he had so desired without risking life or limb. I fur
ther suggest that French lawyers, as a minimal position, always re
tained the option of remaining silent, and that Haennig's very
decision to publish equivocal words seems careerist at best, immoral
at worst.
Through a challenge to the now influential claims of Stanley
Fish, I proceed in this Section to suggest that it may be possible to
abstract from the everyday practice of law a series of norms that
might constrain French (or American) lawyers from again violating
egalitarian traditions as the Vichy lawyers clearly did. By making a
modest move in the direction of Owen Fiss®® and his "disciplining
rules," I thus confirm that constitutional norms deserved to be used as
a standard by French lawyers apart from the situational discourse
that led them to accept, debate, and further the anti-constitutional
racial laws.
More strongly, perhaps, 1 then move to my second corollary;
that interpretive theory must at least allow for the positing of such
norms as absolute constraints upon the day-to-day practice of law.
However difficult the distinction may be between disciplining rules
and everyday rhetoric, the example of Vichy mandates a theoretical
posture recognizing the difference. For theory does affect practice;
the disappearance of textual standards behind the momentary needs
of the Vichy legal interpretive community resulted from a long-stand
ing theoretical posture of text-avoidance or even text-denial within
that community. If post-modem theories such as Fish's prevail, they
will create an atmosphere in the practice that risks replication of the
Vichy experience.
A.

Richard Posner on "Haennig's Choice"

Richard Posner has come to the defense of Joseph Haennig. As
to my finding grotesque Haennig's reasoning, his benign view of Nazi
authorities, and his basic acceptance of the racial scheme adopted by
Vichy lawyers, Posner says:
I am unwilling to accept Weisberg's verdict. Although Haenthe Word's use of Haennig as evidence of the "continuing significance of [the] intellectual eflFort
which is Law and Literature").
82 I have referred throughout this article to the example of Leon Blum and of others, see,
e.g., supra note 41; see also infra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
83 See Fiss, supra note 4; Fish, supra note 4 (response to Fiss); infra text accompanying
note 96 (summarizing the debate).
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nig's article contains no hint of disapproval of the racial laws, it
would not have been published if it had. It does not praise the
laws. The only thing praised is a German decision that saved a
woman who was half-Jewish from the gas chamber. The article
may have saved some French half-Jews. Indeed, it may have saved
more lives than if Haennig had thrown up his law practice and
joined the Resistance .... Maybe he thought the racial laws gro
tesque but knew it would not help to let his feelings show in the
article. What would Weisberg have Haennig do?
It is true that if most Frenchmen had refused to collaborate
with the Nazis, the Jews of France would have been better oflF than
they were by receiving small crumbs of assistance from the hkes of
Haennig. But the problem with mass defiance ... is, who shall
step forward first?®^
Posner observes, speculatively, that the Haennig piece "would
not have been published" if it were overtly resistant to the racial laws.
The statement ignores far more explosive public declarations already
known to the Bar, by such eminent lawyers as Leon Blum and his
own attorneys during the political trials at Riom.®® True, Blum was
already imprisoned when he made his subversive remarks (although
they could not have endeared him to the court or to the Vichy and
German leaders who were in attendance), but his lawyers challenged
the constitutionality of the Vichy regime, of its legislation, of the trial,
etc., and went totally unpunished. Indeed, the Minister of Justice,
Joseph Barthelemy later dined and drank with the defense counsel,
and felt powerless to stop the antigovemment rhetoric of Blum, the
"Jew" to whom the formally "liberal" Justice Minister refers in the
handwritten contemporaneous scribbling I append here.®^
Blum and his lawyers were not unique in "publishing" far more
controversial language than Haennig might have risked for his article.
The head of the Paris Bar Association, Jacques Charpentier, twice
petitioned Petain directly and unambiguously, at some risk to himself
and to his organization.®' He was demanding, first of all, that separaR. POSNER, supra note 80, at 173-74.
See, e.g., AN file 72 AJ-411 passim (Barthelemy's own detailed notes, a mixture of admi
ration and concern, in the face of foundational arguments forcefully mounted by the Riom
defense against the Vichy government and the legitimacy of the trials); H. MICHEL, supra note
17; J. BARTH6LEMY, supra note 10.
See Appendix seven.
8' Charpentier wrote directly to Petain demanding that the defendants at Riom be ade
quately represented by counsel. He, himself, defended Paul Reynaud at that trial. But his
proudest moment, according to his own description, was his second protest to Petain about the
reinstatement by the French government of a lawyer who had been disbarred by Charpentier's
Association. That passionate protest, which succeeded, indicates the willingness of leading
French lawyers to stand up for certain principles (in Charpentier's case, the right to counsel
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tion of powers and right to counsel be observed in the very trial of
Blum I have just mentioned; second, he protested with vigor the gov
ernment's attempt to pass upon membership apphcations for the Bar.
The outcome he sought was achieved in both cases.
These protesting lawyers, whose views constituted direct attacks
on the government and were publicly known, suffered no lossM.
Haennig, writing analytically about a body of laws already strongly
disputed, might well have had "published" at least some language imphcitly attacking the very soundness—the "Frenchness," so to
speak—of the racial laws. But he chose not to. Here we must seek
explanation not in a simpUstic and anachronistic view of the Nazis m
France as an all-terrorizing or all-censoring authority. Everything
was in flux in Vichy France, always. Haennig's refusal to challenge
the laws at their corrupt heart was typical and collegial, but it was not
absolutely mandated.
If he did not go that route, we need to find out why. Perhaps the
answer lies somewhere in the following remarkable passage frtm Jac
ques Charpentier. The head of the Paris Bar, so courageous when his
vital interests were attacked, said this—q/ler the war—about the ra
cial statutes' ostracism of newly admitted Jewish lawyers:
At the Paris Bar, there had always been a Jewish problem. A
number of refugees had a conception of justice very different from
our own
Since 1940, a law excluded the sons of such refugees
from the profession of law. For sever^ prior years, this type of
measure was strongly desired by the Paris Bar
Before the War,
we were invaded by those recently naturalized, almost all of eastem origin, whose language was ridiculed by the Press, thus cover
ing us with shame. They brought to the conduct of their practice
the customs of their bazaars. In this respect, the Vichy policies
comported with our own professional interests, but I only envi
sioned their application after the fact.®®

Charpentier and his Bar association, unlike their colleagues in
Belgium who uniformly protested to a far less independent
ment the ostracism of their Jewish colleagues,®' went along with the
and the right of the Bar to admininister itself without governmental interference). However,
Charpentier's record in other areas implicating foundational French beliefs, including the ra
cial laws, is far more spotty.
,
.
On all these points, see J. CHARPENTIER, supra note 77. See also infra text a^m^ymg
note 88 (discussion of Charpentier's actions and rhetoric on the "Jewish problem at the Pans
bar); 72 A3 file, supra note 85.
88 J. CHARPENTIER, supra note 77, at 127.
89 See a four-page handwritten letter from three leading Brussels lawyers to General von
Folkenhausen, Military Commander for Belgium (November 19, 1940) (Vad Vashem: IV203), expressing outrage at the racial legislation there.
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statutes. Only rarely were there mild protests, for example in 1941
when 40 Jewish lawyers, some quite prominent, were randomly ar
rested in Paris.'" For reasons clear from Charpentier's postwar prose,
but having nothing to do with Posner's theory of enforced restrictions
on debate, Charpentier chose to criticize not the laws themselves but
only their ex post facto appUcation. His choice of discursive center,
like Haennig's, was benignly unthreatening to the system's
bloodstream.
The example of Charpentier indicates that French lawyers felt
empowered to challenge directly some Vichy laws and procedures,
but that they almost always fell short of focusing their discourse on
the jugular of the corrupt new legislation.'^ Yet the example of Blum
and his lawyers at Riom demonstrates the availability—without sanc
tion—of jugular protest.'^ Thus Posner is naive in assertmg that
Haennig "would not have been pubUshed" if he had protested the
laws themselves. More troublingly still, Posner reveals his behefs
about professionalism by implying—without reflection—that publica
tion should have been a goal of Haennig's in any event. The phrase
endorses axiomatically the drive to get pubUshed, whatever the con
text and the other rhetorical or ethical options available to a lavjrer
acting within it. Posner thus slips in as an assumption what is in fact
most controversial in Haennig's choice.
Suppose, against the evidence but in line with Posner's declara
tion, that Haennig indeed could not have been published if he cho^ to
attack the jugular? Then why did he choose to publish at all? There
are only four possible answers. First, Haennig may have been de
lighted with, or indifferent to, the racist aspects of Vichy law. Second,
even if discomfited by the latter, he may have decided to enhance his
career by whatever pragmatic means were available. (Indeed, Haen
nig's views became authoritative in magisterial circles.'^)
Yet if these were Haennig's positions, we surely cannot condone
his drive to see his name in print, however benign his analysis seems
on first blush. But his decision seems no more edifying if we assume
the third possibility: that he strongly opposed the laws but decided to
90 See Appendix nine (headUne reporting the arrests); see also supra note 77 (discussing
these &nrests^
91 Vichy Landlord-Tenant law, even in decisions most favorable to Jewish litigants, illus
trates this failure. See supra Part II.
„
,
» *
92 To be distinguished, however, is the PhUippe Serre version of attack; see supra text ac
companying notes 6-7. Those who challenged the authority of the regime ab initio, as op^
to the constitutionality of its eventual laws and procedures, were often hardly victimized.
93 See Appendix eight, an anonymous reference to Haennig on the official govemmen
stationery of a public prosecutor.
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publish a conciliatory analysis that largely accepted their premises. If
this were true, he appears to have either lacked some of his colleagues'
C9urage in denying the validity itself of the racial legislation, or (less
likely) to have been unaware of such collegial precedents. But even
here, Haennig had a better option, the one assumed away by Posner's
sense of professionalism.
Surely Haennig, faced with these latter feelings, might have
adopted what I would call the "rhetoric of silence"-the eloquent re
fusal to pour additional verbal fuel onto a flamingly corrupt discursive
mass. Posner fails even to consider silence as a professional option in
Vichy-type situations. I will forgo the urge to see here a careerist
program unmindful of ethical considerations, or to elaborate at this
time o� the risks for lawyers of needing constantly to talk. Instead, I
will come to the fourth and most edifying explanation for Haennig's
choice: he detested the legislation but thought that his specific analy
sis might do some good to some unfortunates already subject to it.
This proves at least as problematic as the earlier explanations for
Haennig's choice. For what Posner himself calls the article's mere
"crumbs," thrown by Haennig to a starving community of oppressed
people, tum out to be poisoned. Like all legalistic rhetoric situating
itself at the then-prevalent discursive center (such as the landlord
tenant cases discussed in Part II supra), Haennig's seemingly benign
rhetoric immediately implicated if not condemned thousands of simi
larly situated individuals who could not carry the new burden of proof
proposed by his analysis.
Each legalistic piece of line-drawing, in other words, tightened
the noose around the majority of oppressed people, for such rhetoric
further legitimated the overall scheme of victimization. One person
can prove that going to the synagogue did not imply real Jewish faith;
the next dozen cannot. If the line had not been drawn to protect the
first, some other line might have been drawn to protect the dozen. Or
lawyers might have resisted the temptation to draw any lines, thus
bringing the system to a complete halt. Analogously, one tenant, in
the 20th arrondissement, can show that her husband was arrested
prior to 2 June, 1941; she gains a rent reduction and is not thrown out
on the street. But the next tenant, like most Jews, was arrested after
that date. No relief is afforded, indeed no defense is available and the
courts are not used at all. But if the first piece of legal rhetoric had
drawn the line more favorably to all potential claimants of rent reduc
tions, or if magistrates had quickly begun to express disapproval of
the racial scheme altogether, the "crumbs" would have immediately
gathered into a full meal for Vichy's famished Jews.
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Stanley Fish and the Denial of "Text"

Stanley Fish has not as yet commented on the nexus between his
well-known interpretive theories and the events described generally as
the Holocaust and discussed in their French legalistic guise through
out this Article. But his powerful endorsement of the view that pro
fessional norms cannot exist apart from the practices of the
community allegedly bound by those norms must eventually run up
against Holocaustic barriers. For Fish, only the situation constrains
the professional, and never any set of beliefs "objectively" available to
that person or his colleagues. There is simply no recourse to anything
but the situation:
[Cjommunication occurs within situations. . . . [T]o be in a
situation is already to be in possession of (or possessed by) a struc
ture of assumptions, or practices understood to be relevant in rela
tion to purposes and goals that are already in place; and it is within
the assumption of these purposes and goals that any utterance is
immediately heard.'^

This passage, which might serve as an ex post facto apology for
Joseph Haennig's essay, establishes on a theoretical level the notion
that ideals, norms, beUefs, can never constrain professional behavior.
In a sense, for Fish, these latter simply have no independent existence,
for they are nought but a function of the practice—at any given mo
ment—of the community ostensibly bound by them. This community
is always free to incorporate into its practice—or to eject from it—
earlier understandings of normative conduct.
Nor can any text ever bind a practitioner, because no text exists
apart from that practitioner and the community to which he belongs:
Strictly speaking, getting "back to the text" is not a move one
can perform, because the text one gets back to will be the text de
manded by some other interpretation and that interpretation will
be presiding over its production."

The text, like the norm or foundational belief, exists not separately
from the community employing it but instead within that community.
For Fish, it never stands apart from us—rather, it is us. Our very
sense of what the text is arises from the latest interpretation of the text
rather than from anything "within it"; nothing is "within it" except
that interpretation.
In a well-known debate with Fish, Owen Fiss argues for the
existence of texts and beliefs apart from the interpretive community."
S. FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 149 (1980).
95 Id.
96 See Fiss, supra note 4; Fish, supra note 4.
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A judge, for example, deciding a case under our Constitution, is
bound by norms of interpretive conduct that discipline behavior at the
time of decision-making. And the Constitution, for Fiss, yields mean
ings, i.e., constrains the reader or interpretive community from purely
self-generated or subjective conduct. For Fish, there is no such ex
trinsic discipline, no way to etch into stone either an interpretive
strategy or a set of professional ethics. Instead the standards of pro
fessional conduct are determined at any moment by solely internal,
situational factors, not by any "objective" or foundational definitions.
Most recently, and most portentously, Fish puts it this way:
[I]t is the conditions currently obtaining in the profession rather
than any set of independent and abiding criteria that determine
what is significant and meritorious.97

Were it not for the example of Vichy law, I might find myself in
substantial theoretical agreement with Fish.98 It is very difficult to
"prove" the existence of any entity sufficiently outside a practice to
constrain (objectively) those situated within it. The constraints, as
Fish argues, are inside the practice. But, however difficult the task, I
am inclined to move toward Fiss' position, because I am convinced
that Vichy constrains us, so to speak, to seek the constraint of disci
plining rules. Were French lawyers culturally attuned to reverence
for text instead of textual manipulation (another point I will consider
at greater length in my book), I am convinced they would have sought
in larger numbers to reject as outside the bounds of constitutional and
procedural French norms these strange racial laws. 99
Thus, although Fish always consoles his audiences by saying that
there is no causal connection between his theory and anyone's prac
tice (he must, of course, because to say otherwise would be to contra
dict the theoretical premise that there are no norms apart from
practice, including his norms), I contend that such a connection al97 S. FISH, DoINO WHAT CoMES NATURALLY 177 (1989)

98 See Weisberg, A Response to Fish and White, S Miss. CoL. L. REv. 57 (1984).
99 Vichy lawyers were content to avoid constitutional norms not because they conceived of,
no reality apart from their practice; instead, they avoided them because their cultural and
professional environment condoned text-avoidance and encouraged pragmatic interpretive
flexibility as a professional, hermeneutic norm. For French lawyers, the avoidance of central
realities, see Weisberg, Avoiding Central Realities, supra note 27, at 168-70 and 168 n.49, was
part of their professional and cultural training. In other words, (most) Vichy lawyers felt
unconstrained by the constitutive texts of their tradition because their professional culture
fully empowered them to avoid textualism when other concerns had been brought into compe
tition. This assertion will require an analysis in my forthcoming book of traditional French
anti-Talmudism and of the relationship of legal to Catholic interpretive theory that the Vichy
years expressly brought forth through learned legalistic discussions ofi the anti-Jewish racial
laws. For present purposes, this observation may serve to alert the reader that preponderant
cultural (and theoretical) beliefs do affect professional practice.
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ways exists. If practitioners have been trained to see text as nothing
but themselves, they will so act in times of crisis. If they are trained
to see texts as apart, they will more likely insist on the primacy of
such texts above their own contextual needs and impulses. And since
the constitutive French texts would have yielded principled opposi
tion to the jugular vein of Vichy racism, the dreadful results of 194044 might have been avoided.
So the example of Vichy rhetoric knocks out Fish's contention
that the "significant and meritorious" can ever be exclusively deter
mined by "conditions currently obtaining in the profession.'""' For
there is little of the "meritorious" in the practice of Vichy law, and
the only "significant" aspect of it was its demonstration that we must
seek—however difficult the task—"independent and abiding criteria"
to guide us as legal professionals. Vichy lawyers, as we have seen,
were themselves capable of applying their foundational ethics to a cri
tique of the new regime; so it is not merely our analysis that rejects
Vichy behavior as nonmeritorious. But most Vichy lawyers, like most
Fish-ian professionals, rested easy with the theoretical assumption
that their legal rhetoric was situationally, and in no other way, con
strained. This is what we now have to avoid.
Vichy teaches that practice normatively unconstrained from the
notion of "text" is only as good as the values of its most articulate
practitioner. Liberated from the smallest allegiance to textual con
cepts held dear for 150 years until the moment of Vichy's association
with the victorious Germans, Vichy lawyers were able to foster radi
cal change, not the incremental type with which Fish consoles us.
The radical move once made—that racial legislation was interpretively acceptable—lawyers went about their business splitting hairs,
or, to shift to Posner's metaphor about Haennig, throwing crumbs.
The lesson of Vichy is that professional communities cannot ac
cept theories denying the objective existence of texts. They must re
sist such theories, fight to understand what is meant by textuality as
something apart from any reader or group of readers, and then sub
stantively evaluate the motives and subjective biases from which all
texts are generated. The battleground for us in the 1990s is the battle
ground of texts, not of situationalist theory.
v,

CONCLUSION
Vichy lawyers generated rhetoric that directly led to the concen100 See supra text accompanying note 8 (statement by Phillip Serre that "the Gennans
would not have insisted on a racial policy if the French had refused").
S. FISH, supra note 97, at 177.
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tration camps "in the East." Their willingness to draft laws in a man
ner often exceeding the German conqueror's demands set precedents
even the Nuremberg laws and Nazi courts had not imagined; thensubsequent zeal in interpreting that legislation unconstrained by tradi
tional (textual) French notions of egalitarianism and personal free
dom exemplifies the risks to professional communities of theories
privileging situation over stand^ds.

APPENDIX ONE
Law of 2 June, 1941, Journal OflSciel de la Republique Frangaise
[J.O.] (June 14, 1941).
1. A Jew is: He or she, of whatever faith, who is an issue of at
least three grandparents of the Jewish race, or of simply two if his/
her spouse is an issue herself/himself of two grandparents of the
Jewish race.
A grandparent having belonged to the Jewish religion is con
sidered to be of the Jewish race;
2. He or she who belongs to the Jewish religion, or who belonged
to it on June 25, 1940, and who is the issue of two grandparents of
the Jewish race.
Non-affiliation with the Jewish religion is established by proof
of belonging to one of the other faiths recognized by the State
before the law of 9 December 1905. The disavowal or annulment
of recognition of a child considered to be Jewish is without effect as
regards the preceding sections. [There follows the prohibitions for
such people on property ownership and some employment; sanc
tions—^including imprisonment—are then declared for engaging in
proscribed activities.]
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I

Paris, Is
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•i^Lf I
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CERTIFICATE
OF NON-AFFILIATION TO THE JEWISH RACE
On presentation by the party to the CGQJ of various documents,
we have decided that
at

, bom
should not be considered a

Jew(ess) on the terms of the law of 2 June 1941.
Paris,
Darquier de Pellepoix
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The Germans are shocked to see a Jew hold forth against the
Martial.
No Jew could raise his voice against Hitler where they came
from.
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Office of the Public Prosecutor
On the competence of German military tribunals and the collateral
effect of their decisions for French courts, see J. Haennig.
Gaz Palais 10-12 February, 1943

APPENDIX NINE
Headline: I have seen them, these Jewish Millionaires: Former Ce
lebrities of the Paris Bar, Interned in a Camp near our Capital
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Judenabschub aus Frsnkroich.
VOTX.S Beoprschung iwischen {'-Obersturmbannfiihrer ZSiehmann und
^ ' fJ-Hauprsiuimtfuhrer Sannecker am 1.7.'19't2 in Faiii?.
Dio Verhnndlungen mit der franzSsiscbec Reglerung habcn Jizwisokcn r.u folgenden Ergebnia gefiihrt :
Samtliche Btcctanloaa Juden dar beaebzten und unbesetzten
^
Zone warden fiir den Abacbab berei- geatellt.
Prarident LAVAL hat vorgeachlagen, beln Abschnb .IfidlacherPami-^
lien aus desi unbeaetzten Ciebiet, auch die unter 16 Jahre alteu Eir>- •
der xitzunohaen. Lie JTage von in beaetzten Gebiet suriickbleibenden
Juaankindcrn intereaslirt ihn nicht,
Ich bitto deskalbnm dringcnOe 72 Entucheidung daruber, ob,
'
elwa jajjlrjiond ait den 15. Jucontransport aua Fraakreich, auca Kinder
Vii-.tsiJr.hren mit abgescbobcn vjardon ,lconnen.
?

S '
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• >K1W» niVVD
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^Pariai den 21.7>19'>2

IV J SA 229 •
Uin/Blr

Bgtr.; Judonabechub.

1.) Vermerk i

Am

20.7.19A2 rieftat-ObereturnbannfUhirer EICHMASM und

ff-Obersturnfiihrer NOTAK voo BSHA IV B A bier an.
Ult (J-OberBturmbannfOhrer liehaann eurde die grafa
dee Xlnderabechubea besprochen. Sr entaehiad, daC. aobald
d^lbtfanepprt In 'd"aa""GeaeraiKOUveraeaient eieder iioglleh

'1
'

iat, Kindortranaporte rollen komen.
iiSherte^iuTaide •Auf^aV

ff-OborsturmfObMr

Rowa*

Septcnber etwa 6 Transporto

aach den Gineralgouvemament zu arnSglich-jn, die Juden ailar
Art (auch arbeitaunf&hlBe un<l alte Judan) anthaltan kBnnan.
Ea Burde ,i^barsturmbannfuhper Elchnana famer

tcilt,

daB

Vtriaufig

ledigllcb noch 1o

Traneporten

nltge- '

eSgliob

wBran und dafl wegen dcr Paatnalwa weitarar Judan Varhandlungea
nit dar rranzosischen aeglarunB aclraebVan.
wcaep

inteknn

.f.ia.iafalleBen Trar.aporteV' auB_gortoaMi vm;do

Ji-kiart," daB, mrolii dar durch ;<-StandartenfUbrar
aoio l-ranzortiachan i-olizelchof
Ifiuiig nur Btaatenlosa

Kcoo.ian

Bousquet seoachtea Zuaaga, iroi»u nehmen, ohna hiesls a Zuioi'

aina- v8_Xlie"S^*~135e ant»"->t.1an aai, die d_a8_Eanza Konaapt
ungeworfen hatte*
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